Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority
365 U.S. 715 (1961)
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Rule of Law:
When a state leases public property to a private actor and the state and private actor have a symbiotic relationship of interdependence, the private actor's discriminatory conduct constitutes state action and is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts:
- The Wilmington Parking Authority, a Delaware state agency, was created to provide public parking facilities.
- To finance the construction of a public parking garage, the Authority determined it was necessary to lease commercial space within the building to private tenants.
- The Authority leased space to Eagle Coffee Shoppe, Inc. for use as a restaurant.
- The land and building are publicly owned, and the Authority is responsible for the building's maintenance and upkeep.
- The rent from Eagle and other commercial tenants was financially indispensable for the Authority to meet its debt-service requirements and make the public project self-sustaining.
- The relationship was mutually beneficial; the restaurant gained customers from the convenient parking, and the parking garage gained customers from restaurant patrons. Eagle also enjoyed the Authority's tax-exempt status for certain improvements.
- The lease agreement between the Authority and Eagle did not contain a clause requiring the restaurant to serve all members of the public without discrimination.
- Louis Burton, a Black man, was refused service at the Eagle Coffee Shoppe solely because of his race after parking his car in the public facility.
Procedural Posture:
- Louis Burton filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Delaware Court of Chancery (trial court).
- On motions for summary judgment, the Chancellor ruled in favor of Burton, finding the discrimination constituted state action.
- Eagle Coffee Shoppe, Inc. appealed to the Supreme Court of Delaware, the state's highest court.
- The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the trial court, holding that Eagle was acting in a 'purely private capacity' and its actions were not state action.
- Burton appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a private restaurant's refusal to serve an individual because of their race constitute state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause when the restaurant leases space in a publicly owned and operated parking facility, and the restaurant's financial success is an indispensable part of the public facility's financial plan?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Clark
Yes, the restaurant's discriminatory refusal of service constitutes state action. The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the private lessee that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity. The Court found that the public ownership of the land and building, the financial integration of the restaurant into the public purpose of the parking garage, the mutual benefits conferred, and the public character of the building created a symbiotic relationship. By its inaction in the lease, the State made itself a party to the discrimination and placed its power, property, and prestige behind it, bringing the private conduct within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Stewart
Yes, the judgment should be reversed, but on narrower grounds. The Supreme Court of Delaware's decision relied on a state statute, 24 Del. Code § 1501, which it construed as authorizing a restaurant to refuse service based on a discriminatory classification of customers. A state law that authorizes racial discrimination is clearly a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the statute itself is unconstitutional as applied, and it is unnecessary to reach the broader and more complex question of state action based on the lease agreement.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Harlan
No, the Court should not decide the state action question at this time. The majority's fact-based analysis leaves the definition of 'state action' completely at sea. The case should first be remanded to the Supreme Court of Delaware for clarification on whether the state statute, 24 Del. C. § 1501, was interpreted to authorize racial discrimination. If it was, the statute is unconstitutional, and this case can be decided on that narrow ground without reaching the far-reaching constitutional questions the majority addresses prematurely.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Frankfurter
No, the Court should not decide the complex constitutional question of state action. The Delaware Supreme Court's interpretation of its own statute is ambiguous. The proper course of action is to ask the state court for clarification, as suggested by Justice Harlan. Deciding serious constitutional issues before it is necessary to do so violates the principles of sound constitutional adjudication.
Analysis:
This case is significant for establishing the 'symbiotic relationship' test for state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. It broadened the scope of state action beyond direct government conduct to include situations where the government is deeply intertwined with a private entity, making them effectively 'joint participants.' The decision created a fact-intensive inquiry, requiring courts to sift facts and weigh circumstances to determine if the state has 'insinuated itself' into a position of interdependence with a private discriminator. This precedent affects all government leasing and contracting, suggesting that the government cannot abdicate its constitutional responsibilities by privatizing functions that remain financially and physically integrated with a public purpose.
