Burt v. Titlow
2013 U.S. LEXIS 8039, 571 U.S. 12, 134 S. Ct. 10 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
When a state prisoner seeks federal habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining, federal courts must apply a "doubly deferential" standard of review, deferring to both the state court's reasonable factual findings and the strong presumption of defense counsel's effective performance under Strickland v. Washington.
Facts:
- Titlow and Billie Rogers, Titlow's aunt, murdered Billie's husband, Don Rogers, by pouring vodka down his throat and smothering him with a pillow.
- With attorney Richard Lustig's help, Titlow reached an agreement with state prosecutors to testify against Billie, plead guilty to manslaughter, and receive a 7- to 15-year sentence.
- Titlow confirmed at a plea hearing that Lustig had reviewed the State's evidence with her and that she understood the evidence could support a conviction for first-degree murder.
- Three days before Billie Rogers' trial was to commence, Titlow retained a new lawyer, Frederick Toca.
- With Toca's help, Titlow demanded a substantially lower minimum sentence (three years, instead of seven) in exchange for her agreement to plead guilty and testify.
- When the prosecutor refused Titlow's new demands, Titlow withdrew her plea, acknowledging in open court the consequences, including the reinstatement of the first-degree murder charge.
- Without Titlow's critical testimony, Billie Rogers was acquitted and later died.
- Titlow subsequently stood trial, during which she denied any intent to harm Don Rogers or any knowledge, at the time she covered his mouth or poured vodka down his throat, that Billie intended to harm him, testifying instead that she attempted to prevent Billie from harming her husband.
Procedural Posture:
- Titlow's initial plea bargain was approved by the Michigan trial court.
- Titlow subsequently stood trial in Michigan state court, where a jury convicted her of second-degree murder, and the trial court imposed a 20- to 40-year term of imprisonment.
- Titlow appealed her conviction to the Michigan Court of Appeals, arguing that her new counsel, Frederick Toca, provided ineffective assistance by advising withdrawal of the guilty plea without adequately learning about the case.
- The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Titlow's claim, finding that Toca acted reasonably given Titlow's protestations of innocence.
- Titlow filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
- The District Court denied habeas relief, concluding that the Michigan Court of Appeals' ruling was "completely reasonable on the law and the facts."
- Titlow appealed the District Court's decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
- The Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court, finding that the state court's factual predicate was unreasonable and that Toca rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and remanded the case with instructions for the prosecution to reoffer the original plea agreement.
- The State of Michigan (through its warden, Burt) petitioned for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted review.
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Issue:
Did the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals err by failing to apply a doubly deferential standard when reviewing a state prisoner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim under AEDPA, by refusing to credit a state court's reasonable factual finding and by assuming counsel was ineffective where the record was silent?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Alito
No, the Sixth Circuit erred by failing to apply the "doubly deferential" standard required when a federal court reviews a state prisoner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim during plea bargaining under AEDPA. The Court reasoned that AEDPA mandates a highly deferential standard for federal courts reviewing state court decisions, allowing reversal only if the state court's factual findings were "unreasonable" or its legal application "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of" clearly established federal law. The Sixth Circuit improperly set aside the Michigan Court of Appeals' reasonable factual finding that Titlow's plea withdrawal was based on her assertion of innocence. This finding was supported by evidence such as Titlow's passing a polygraph denying intent to kill Don Rogers, her conversation with a jailer advising against pleading guilty if innocent, and the timing of Toca's hiring. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit incorrectly reversed the strong presumption of effectiveness for defense counsel under Strickland v. Washington by assuming Toca was ineffective merely because the record was silent on whether he gave adequate advice, placing the burden on counsel rather than the defendant. The Court emphasized that the absence of evidence cannot overcome the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and Toca was justified in relying on Titlow's prior open-court admission that she understood the strength of the prosecution's case. The Sixth Amendment guarantees effective assistance, not perfect counsel.
Concurring - Justice Sotomayor
Yes, the Court correctly concluded that Titlow failed to present enough evidence to overcome the two presumptions of effectiveness for counsel (Strickland) and correctness for the state court's ruling (AEDPA). Justice Sotomayor emphasized that a defendant's proclamation of innocence does not relieve counsel of the responsibility to make an independent examination of the case and offer informed advice, including an analysis of trial risks, before the client makes a plea decision. She clarified that the majority's statement about a proclamation of innocence affecting counsel's advice simply means that advice will reflect the client's adequately informed objectives. She noted that had Titlow made a stronger factual record demonstrating Toca's failure to educate himself, she could have prevailed, but she did not meet her burden.
Concurring in the judgment - Justice Ginsburg
Yes, while finding Toca's conduct "far from exemplary," the Court's judgment is correct because the prosecutor's original plea agreement hinged entirely on Titlow's willingness to testify against her aunt. Once Titlow reneged on that promise, the plea bargain failed, and as plea bargains are essentially contracts, there was no "extant bargain" for the prosecution to renew or for the court to order reoffered. With the original plea offer no longer alive, Titlow's subsequent conviction after a trial free from reversible error should stand.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the high bar for federal habeas relief under AEDPA, particularly for ineffective assistance of counsel claims that challenge state court decisions. It underscores the "doubly deferential" standard, requiring federal courts to defer not only to state court legal conclusions but also to their factual findings unless demonstrably unreasonable. The decision warns against reversing the Strickland presumption of counsel's effectiveness, making it clear that a silent record cannot be used to prove deficient performance. This limits the ability of federal courts to second-guess state judicial processes, emphasizing the principle of comity and the competence of state courts to adjudicate federal rights. Future cases will likely face increased difficulty in overcoming state court factual determinations regarding counsel's performance unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
