Burt N. Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins
1995 WL 3408, 45 F.3d 724 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
To defeat a motion for summary judgment in an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) case, a plaintiff who has established a prima facie case need only point to evidence sufficient to allow a factfinder to reasonably disbelieve the employer's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Additionally, a district court abuses its discretion by substituting its own discovery device, such as a 'Bill of Particulars,' for the procedures mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Facts:
- Burt Sempier began working for Johnson & Higgins (J & H), an insurance brokerage firm, in 1968 and was promoted through several executive positions, becoming Chief Financial Officer (CFO) in 1984.
- Despite alleged criticisms of his performance by some directors, Sempier was elected to the J & H Board of Directors in 1986, at which time he was required to execute a letter of resignation that could be made effective by a two-thirds board vote.
- In 1987, J & H moved Sempier from CFO to Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), and in 1989, the company instituted an early retirement program for employees aged 55 and older to remove 'redundant' and 'poorly performing' staff.
- J & H hired Alan Page, 14 years younger than Sempier, as Chief Information Officer in December 1989, stripping Sempier of his Management Information Systems responsibilities.
- Three months later, J & H hired Thomas Carpenter, 4 years younger than Sempier, to assume Sempier's Human Resources and Professional Development duties, leaving Sempier with significantly reduced responsibilities.
- In April 1990, J & H's chairman, Robert Hatcher, told Sempier to take early retirement, stating he had 'lost credibility' and had no choice but to retire or be forced out.
- Sempier refused to retire and, after over a year of negotiations during which he hired a lawyer, J & H's new chairman ordered him to vacate his office.
- In June 1991, the J & H Board of Directors voted to make Sempier's previously executed resignation effective, thereby terminating his employment.
Procedural Posture:
- Burt Sempier filed an age discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and received a right-to-sue letter.
- Sempier sued Johnson & Higgins (J & H) in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging violations of the ADEA and other state laws.
- During discovery, the district court affirmed a magistrate judge's order that relieved J & H from answering Sempier's interrogatories and instead required J & H to answer a court-drafted 'Bill of Particulars.'
- J & H filed a motion for summary judgment on Sempier's ADEA claim.
- The district court granted J & H's motion for summary judgment, finding Sempier had not produced sufficient evidence of pretext, and dismissed the state law claims without prejudice.
- Sempier (appellant) appealed the grant of summary judgment and the discovery ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, where J & H was the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff in an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) case raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment by introducing evidence that casts doubt on the credibility of the employer's articulated reason for termination, such as a history of satisfactory performance and a coercive retirement policy?
Opinions:
Majority - Garth, J.
Yes, a plaintiff raises a genuine issue of material fact by pointing to evidence from which a jury could reasonably discredit the employer's reason for termination. To survive summary judgment, an ADEA plaintiff need not prove that age was the determinative factor, but merely that the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual. The court found that Sempier first established a prima facie case of age discrimination: he was in the protected class (over 40), was objectively qualified based on his twenty-plus years in executive roles, suffered an adverse employment action, and his duties were reassigned to significantly younger employees. J & H then met its burden by articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for Sempier's discharge—poor performance. However, Sempier successfully created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether this reason was pretextual by presenting evidence of: (1) his own testimony and that of the former chairman attesting to his satisfactory performance; (2) two formal written performance evaluations that rated his performance as satisfactory; and (3) the existence of a coercive early retirement program under which he was told he had no choice but to retire or be forced out. This conflicting evidence on the ultimate issue of J & H's motivation must be resolved by a jury, not by a judge weighing credibility on a summary judgment motion.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle that at the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff's burden in a pretext-based discrimination case is not to prove discrimination, but to create a triable issue of fact regarding the credibility of the employer's explanation. By emphasizing that a plaintiff's evidence of satisfactory performance and the context of a coercive retirement policy can directly rebut an employer's claim of poor performance, the court makes it more difficult for employers to win discrimination cases on summary judgment simply by asserting subjective negative evaluations. The ruling solidifies the idea that weighing conflicting evidence and making credibility determinations are functions reserved exclusively for the jury. The court's sharp rebuke of the district court's use of a 'Bill of Particulars' also serves as a strong precedent against judicial deviation from the discovery methods prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
