Burrows v. State
1931 Ariz. LEXIS 215, 38 Ariz. 99, 297 P. 1029 (1931)
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Rule of Law:
A prosecutor's closing argument in a capital case that references a notorious, unrelated crime to improperly influence the jury's sentencing decision constitutes prejudicial error requiring a new trial, which cannot be cured by a judicial instruction to disregard the comment.
Facts:
- Richard N. Burrows, an 18 or 19-year-old, was left alone and penniless in Phoenix, Arizona.
- Attempting to travel back to his home in Chicago, Burrows accepted a ride from Jack Martin.
- During the drive, Martin provided Burrows with beer and whiskey, urging him to drink.
- Burrows, who had never consumed alcohol before, testified that he drank out of fear that Martin would otherwise abandon him on the desert.
- Martin became so intoxicated that a service station attendant suggested Burrows drive the car, which he did.
- A few miles past Morristown, while Martin was in a drunken stupor in the passenger seat, Burrows shot and killed him.
- Burrows then drove the car to an arroyo, took Martin's money, partially buried the body, and continued on in Martin's vehicle.
- Burrows was subsequently apprehended in Denver, Colorado.
Procedural Posture:
- The county attorney of Maricopa county filed an information charging Richard N. Burrows with murder in the superior court.
- Before trial, Burrows filed a plea in abatement, arguing the superior court lacked jurisdiction because he was under 18 at the time of the offense.
- The trial judge denied a jury trial on the age issue, held a hearing, and ruled that Burrows was over 18 and subject to the court's jurisdiction.
- The case was tried before a jury.
- The jury found Burrows guilty of murder in the first degree and fixed the penalty at death.
- The trial court entered judgment on the verdict and later overruled Burrows' motion for a new trial.
- Burrows (appellant) appealed from the judgment and the order denying a new trial to this court.
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Issue:
Do a prosecutor's closing arguments in a capital case, which reference a notorious murder case to imply the jury will face public criticism if they do not impose the death penalty, constitute prejudicial error requiring a new trial, despite a curative instruction from the court?
Opinions:
Majority - Lockwood, J.
Yes, such remarks constitute prejudicial error requiring a new trial. The court held that while the evidence of guilt for first-degree murder was overwhelming, the prosecutor's remarks were highly prejudicial regarding the penalty. By referencing the notorious Leopold-Loeb case, the prosecutor improperly suggested the jury would face public criticism if it returned a sentence of life imprisonment instead of death. This was particularly damaging in a case with potential mitigating circumstances, such as the defendant's youth, inexperience, and possible intoxication urged upon him by the victim. The court concluded that the remark was so egregious and inflammatory that the trial judge's instruction to disregard it was insufficient to cure the prejudice, thus violating the defendant's right to a fair sentencing determination and requiring reversal.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant limit on prosecutorial conduct during closing arguments, especially in capital cases. It underscores that even where guilt is clear, the sentencing phase must be free from improper influences, such as appeals to public pressure or inflammatory comparisons to dissimilar, notorious cases. The ruling highlights that the harmless error doctrine is not boundless and will not excuse prosecutorial misconduct that fundamentally taints the jury's discretion in deciding between life and death. This precedent serves as a strong admonition to prosecutors to base their arguments solely on the evidence and law of the case at hand, reinforcing the judiciary's role in protecting the integrity of capital sentencing proceedings.
