Burrage v. United States
134 S. Ct. 881 (2014)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
For a defendant to be liable for the mandatory minimum sentence enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), the prosecution must prove that the use of the drug distributed by the defendant was the but-for cause of the victim's death or serious bodily injury.
Facts:
- Joshua Banka was a long-time drug user.
- On April 14, 2010, Banka engaged in a drug binge, consuming marijuana and injecting stolen oxycodone.
- Later that day, Banka and his wife purchased one gram of heroin from Marcus Burrage.
- Banka injected the heroin supplied by Burrage on two separate occasions that evening and early the next morning.
- Banka had a cocktail of other drugs in his system at the time, including oxycodone, alprazolam, and clonazepam.
- On April 15, 2010, Banka's wife found him dead from what medical experts later described as 'mixed drug intoxication.'
- Medical experts testified that the heroin supplied by Burrage was a 'contributing factor' in Banka's death, but they could not say that Banka would have lived had he not taken the heroin.
Procedural Posture:
- Marcus Burrage was charged in a federal district court with distributing heroin from which death resulted.
- At trial, the district court denied Burrage's motion for acquittal, which argued the government failed to prove but-for causation.
- The court rejected Burrage's proposed jury instruction on but-for and proximate causation, instead instructing the jury that the government only needed to prove the heroin was a 'contributing cause' of death.
- The jury convicted Burrage, and the trial court sentenced him to the 20-year mandatory minimum.
- Burrage (appellant) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that the 'contributing cause' instruction was legally correct.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the causation standard.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the penalty enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), which applies when 'death... results from the use of' a distributed drug, apply when the drug is merely a 'contributing cause' rather than a but-for cause of the death?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
No. A defendant cannot be liable under the penalty enhancement provision of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) unless the use of the distributed drug is a but-for cause of the death or injury. The ordinary meaning of the statutory phrase 'results from' imposes a requirement of actual, but-for causation, a deeply rooted principle in criminal law. This interpretation is consistent with the Court's previous reading of similar causal language in other statutes, such as 'because of' and 'by reason of.' The government’s proposed 'contributing-cause' standard is rejected because it is an amorphous and ill-defined test that would create uncertainty, which is incompatible with the high standard of proof and clarity required in criminal law. Citing the rule of lenity, the Court held that where a criminal statute is ambiguous, it should be interpreted in favor of the defendant, thus mandating the stricter but-for causation standard.
Concurring - Justice Ginsburg
No. While disagreeing with the majority's broad equation of causal language across different types of statutes (specifically, antidiscrimination laws), the judgment is correct in this specific context. In the interpretation of a criminal statute, the rule of lenity dictates that any ambiguity should be resolved in the defendant's favor. Therefore, because the phrase 'results from' is open to interpretation, the court should adopt the stricter but-for causation standard rather than the more permissive 'contributing factor' test that would disadvantage the defendant.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the causation standard required for the 'death results' sentencing enhancement in federal drug statutes, establishing but-for causality as the default rule. It raises the evidentiary burden for prosecutors in mixed-drug overdose cases, as they can no longer rely on expert testimony that the defendant's drug was merely a 'contributing factor.' The ruling reinforces textualist principles and the rule of lenity in criminal law, signaling that Congress must use explicit language if it intends to impose liability based on a lesser standard of causation. This precedent will likely limit the application of the severe mandatory minimum sentence in complex overdose scenarios involving multiple substances.
Unlock the full brief for Burrage v. United States