Burnsed v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad Company
1974 Fla. LEXIS 4389, 290 So.2d 13 (1974)
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Rule of Law:
A state statute requiring railroads to place visual warning devices when a train blocks a public road at night is a valid and reasonable exercise of the state's police power, as it bears a rational relationship to public safety. Such a statute will be interpreted to imply a 'reasonable time' for compliance if it does not explicitly state a timeframe.
Facts:
- On March 22, 1972, shortly after midnight, a freight train owned by Seaboard Coastline Railroad Company was stopped, blocking an unlighted county road.
- The train had stopped involuntarily due to a mechanical failure involving a loss of air pressure in its braking system.
- The train remained blocking the crossing for approximately ten minutes while the crew prepared to investigate the problem.
- The crossing was protected only by standard railroad crossbuck signs, and the train crew did not place any lighted fusees or other visual warning devices on the road.
- Benjamin Levy Burnsed, who had consumed several alcoholic drinks hours earlier, was driving his car and collided with the side of the stationary freight train.
- The train crew was unaware that the collision had occurred and proceeded on their way once the brakes automatically released.
Procedural Posture:
- Benjamin Levy Burnsed sued Seaboard Coastline Railroad Company in the Circuit Court of Pasco County, Florida (trial court).
- Seaboard moved for summary judgment, arguing in part that the controlling state statute was unconstitutional.
- The trial court granted a partial summary judgment in favor of Seaboard, ruling that Florida Statute § 357.08 was an unconstitutional exercise of the state's police power.
- Burnsed, as appellant, sought an interlocutory appeal of this ruling to the Supreme Court of Florida.
- The Supreme Court of Florida treated the appeal as a petition for a writ of certiorari and exercised its discretion to accept jurisdiction over the case.
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Issue:
Does Florida Statute § 357.08, which requires railroad crews to place visual warning devices when a train blocks a road at night, constitute an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the state's police power and is therefore unconstitutional?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Roberts
No. Florida Statute § 357.08 is a constitutional exercise of the state's police power. The state's police power is the sovereign right to enact laws for the protection of lives, health, and general welfare, and the legislature is granted great discretion in determining measures for public protection. The statute bears a clear and reasonable relationship to public safety by seeking to prevent collisions between motorists and trains blocking dark roadways. The requirement to place a warning device is a relatively small burden on the railroad compared to the significant threat to human life it mitigates. The court reasoned that it is immaterial whether the train's stop was voluntary or involuntary, as the danger to the public remains the same. Furthermore, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague for failing to specify a time for compliance; a 'reasonable time' to place the warning devices will be implied, with the determination of what is reasonable being a question of fact for a jury.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Justice Ervin
Yes, the statute is constitutional. However, the dissent disagrees with the majority's jurisdictional analysis. Justice Ervin argued that the Florida Constitution grants an appeal as a matter of right from any trial court order, final or not, that directly passes on the validity of a state statute. He contended that the majority improperly limited the court's jurisdiction by interpreting the constitutional language to require a 'final order,' thereby making review discretionary via certiorari rather than mandatory via direct appeal.
Analysis:
This case reaffirms the broad scope of a state's police power to regulate industries in the interest of public safety. The court's decision to imply a 'reasonable time' for compliance into the statute is a significant example of judicial interpretation aimed at saving a statute from being struck down for vagueness. This ruling establishes that a safety regulation's validity does not depend on the regulated party's intent or the cause of the hazardous condition; the duty to protect the public arises from the existence of the danger itself. This precedent strengthens the state's ability to impose safety requirements on industries where operations can pose a risk to the public, ensuring that minor burdens on businesses are justified by the goal of protecting human life.
