Burns v. United States
501 U.S. 129 (1991)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 requires a district court to give the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating a 'sua sponte' upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines. This notice must specifically identify the ground on which the court is considering the departure.
Facts:
- William Burns was an employee of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID).
- From 1982 to 1988, Burns used his supervisory position to fraudulently authorize the payment of over $1.2 million in AID funds into a bank account he controlled under a fictitious name.
- The scheme involved 53 separate fraudulent payments over a six-year period.
- After being discovered, Burns agreed to plead guilty to charges including theft of government funds and tax evasion.
- Both Burns and the government agreed in the plea agreement to an expected sentencing range of 30 to 37 months under the Sentencing Guidelines.
- A probation officer's presentence report confirmed the 30-37 month range and stated, 'There are no factors that would warrant departure from the guideline sentence.'
Procedural Posture:
- William Burns pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to a three-count information.
- At the sentencing hearing, the District Court, on its own initiative, departed upward from the Sentencing Guidelines range and sentenced Burns to 60 months' imprisonment.
- Burns (appellant) appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing he was entitled to advance notice of the court's intent to depart.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's sentence, holding that Rule 32 did not contain an express requirement for such notice.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts on this issue.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 require a district court to provide notice to the parties before it departs upward from the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range on its own initiative (sua sponte)?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Marshall
Yes. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 requires a district court to give parties notice before departing upward from the Sentencing Guidelines on its own initiative. Rule 32(a)(1) provides parties with an 'opportunity to comment upon... matters relating to the appropriate sentence.' This right is rendered meaningless if the defendant is not notified that the court is contemplating a sua sponte departure, as there is no way for counsel to anticipate and address the potential grounds for such a decision. Because the Guidelines present a vast number of potential departure factors, failing to provide notice would make it impossible for counsel to 'comment' in a coherent way, a result the Court deemed absurd. Interpreting the rule to require notice also avoids the serious constitutional due process questions that would arise if a defendant could be deprived of liberty based on grounds they had no opportunity to contest.
Dissenting - Justice Souter
No. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 does not require a district court to give advance notice of its intent to depart upward sua sponte. The Sentencing Reform Act is an extraordinarily detailed statutory scheme that provides for notice explicitly in many other contexts. Congress's silence on this specific form of notice, in contrast to its express requirements elsewhere, implies that no such notice was intended. The right to comment on 'matters relating to the appropriate sentence' is not rendered meaningless, as the Sentencing Act itself puts parties on notice that departure is always a possibility, allowing them to address it generally. The majority's holding is not a construction of the rule but an improper judicial enlargement of it, and the existing procedures, including the right to appeal an unreasonable sentence, are sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a critical procedural safeguard in federal sentencing by mandating notice for sua sponte upward departures. It reinforces the adversarial nature of the sentencing process under the Guidelines, ensuring that defendants have a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the specific reasons for a potential increase in their sentence. The ruling prevents sentencing hearings from becoming a one-sided affair where a defendant is ambushed by a judge's unannounced intentions, thereby promoting fairness, predictability, and a more fully developed record for appellate review. It firmly places the burden on the court to be transparent, significantly impacting how district judges manage sentencing proceedings and communicate with the parties.
