Burns v. Reed
500 U.S. 478 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
A prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity under § 1983 for conduct intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, such as participating in a probable-cause hearing, but is entitled only to qualified immunity for giving legal advice to police during the investigative phase of a case.
Facts:
- Cathy Burns reported to Muncie, Indiana police that an unknown assailant had entered her home and shot her two sons.
- Investigating officers came to view Burns as the primary suspect, speculating she had multiple personalities.
- The officers decided to interview Burns under hypnosis and first sought advice from Chief Deputy Prosecutor Richard Reed, who told them they could proceed.
- While under hypnosis, Burns referred to the assailant as "Katie" and also referred to herself by that name.
- The officers interpreted this as a confession and, after consulting Reed again, were told they "probably had probable cause" to arrest Burns, which they then did.
- The following day, Reed appeared at a probable-cause hearing to obtain a search warrant for Burns's house and car.
- At the hearing, Reed elicited testimony from an officer that Burns had confessed to the shooting.
- Neither Reed nor the officer informed the judge that the "confession" was obtained under hypnosis or that Burns had otherwise consistently denied guilt.
Procedural Posture:
- Cathy Burns filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against Deputy Prosecutor Richard Reed and others.
- After Burns presented her case at trial, the District Court granted a directed verdict in favor of Reed, finding he was absolutely immune from liability.
- Burns (appellant) appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment, holding that Reed (appellee) was entitled to absolute immunity for both giving legal advice to the police and for his participation in the probable-cause hearing.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding the scope of prosecutorial immunity.
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Issue:
Does a state prosecutor have absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for (1) participating in a probable-cause hearing to obtain a search warrant and (2) giving legal advice to police during a criminal investigation?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
Yes, as to participating in the probable-cause hearing; No, as to giving legal advice to the police. A prosecutor's immunity depends on the function performed. For participating in the probable-cause hearing, a prosecutor is absolutely immune because this conduct is 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.' Appearing before a judge to present evidence for a warrant is the work of an advocate for the state, a role which common law protected with absolute immunity to ensure the independent and vigorous functioning of the judicial process. However, for giving legal advice to the police, a prosecutor is entitled only to qualified immunity. This function is not advocatory but investigatory, as it occurs before the initiation of prosecution and is not closely tied to the judicial process. There is no historical or common-law basis for extending absolute immunity to this advisory role. Furthermore, qualified immunity provides ample protection for prosecutors while ensuring they hesitate before giving advice that would violate clearly established constitutional rights.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
Yes, as to eliciting false statements in a judicial hearing; No, as to giving legal advice to police. While concurring with the majority's conclusions on the issues it addressed, the dissent argues the Court failed to consider a distinct claim: the prosecutor's action of wrongfully initiating the search warrant proceeding itself. The common law in 1871 did not provide absolute immunity for maliciously procuring a search warrant, which was a form of malicious prosecution, not defamation. This function is not judicial but investigatory. Following the functional approach, procuring a search warrant is even 'further removed from the judicial phase of criminal proceedings' than procuring an arrest warrant, for which police officers receive only qualified immunity under Malley v. Briggs. Therefore, the prosecutor's decision to seek the warrant, separate from his in-court conduct, should only be protected by qualified immunity.
Analysis:
This case refines the 'functional approach' to prosecutorial immunity established in Imbler v. Pachtman. It creates a clear distinction between a prosecutor's advocatory functions, which receive absolute immunity, and their investigative or administrative functions, which receive only qualified immunity. By denying absolute immunity for giving legal advice to police, the Court holds prosecutors accountable for their role in pre-prosecution investigations that may violate constitutional rights. This decision reinforces that immunity attaches to the specific function performed, not the prosecutor's title, thereby limiting the scope of absolute immunity to actions directly connected to the judicial process.
