Burns v. McCormick
135 N.E. 273 (1922)
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Rule of Law:
For an oral contract for the conveyance of real property to be enforced under the part performance exception to the Statute of Frauds, the performer's actions must be "unequivocally referable" to the alleged agreement. The acts performed must be unintelligible or extraordinary without the existence of the contract, and they must themselves supply the key to what was promised.
Facts:
- In June 1918, James A. Halsey, an elderly widower, lived alone in his house in Hornell, New York.
- Halsey orally promised the plaintiffs that if they gave up their home and draying business in Andover, New York, and moved in to board and care for him for the rest of his life, he would give them his house and its contents upon his death.
- In reliance on this promise, the plaintiffs sold their interest in the business and moved into Halsey's home.
- The plaintiffs boarded, tended, and cared for Halsey until his death approximately five months later.
- Halsey died without having executed a will or deed that transferred the property to the plaintiffs.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiffs sued for specific performance in a New York trial court.
- The case was heard by a referee, who found in favor of the plaintiffs.
- A judgment was entered on the referee's report ordering specific performance.
- The defendant (Halsey's estate) appealed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
- The defendant then appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does giving up a home and business to move in with and care for a person until his death, pursuant to an oral promise to convey the property upon death, constitute part performance that is "unequivocally referable" to the alleged agreement and sufficient to overcome the Statute of Frauds?
Opinions:
Majority - Cardozo, J.
No. The plaintiffs' acts of part performance are not unequivocally referable to the alleged oral agreement to convey land and therefore are insufficient to take the contract out of the Statute of Frauds. To satisfy the part performance exception, the acts must be unintelligible or at least extraordinary unless as an incident of ownership. Here, the plaintiffs' actions of moving in and providing care could be explained by other arrangements; they might have been servants, guests, or kin rendering services in exchange for lodging or with a vague expectation of a future reward. The plaintiffs never occupied the land as owners; Halsey retained possession, paid taxes, and maintained the property. Their actions do not, by themselves, supply the key to what was promised. Inadequacy of a legal remedy for the plaintiffs' other losses, such as giving up their business, does not dispense with the strict requirement that the acts of performance must themselves evidence the existence of the particular contract alleged.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a very stringent standard for the part performance exception to the Statute of Frauds in New York. By requiring that performance be "unequivocally referable" to the contract, the court elevates the policy of the statute—preventing fraud and perjury—over the equitable interest in protecting a party's reliance on an oral promise. This precedent significantly narrows the circumstances under which oral contracts for land can be enforced, making it clear that performing personal services alone is insufficient. The ruling dictates that future claims will likely fail unless the acts of performance are indicative of ownership, such as taking exclusive possession and making substantial improvements to the property.
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