Burnley v. Stevenson
Unknown (1873)
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Rule of Law:
A decree from a court of equity in one state, which possessed personal jurisdiction over the parties, must be given full faith and credit in the state where the subject land is located. While the decree cannot directly transfer title, it is conclusive as to the parties' equitable rights and can be used as a valid equitable defense in an action concerning the land.
Facts:
- The ancestor of the plaintiffs, Gen. Scott, entered into a contract to convey certain lands located in Ohio to John Evans.
- After Gen. Scott's death, legal title to the Ohio lands descended to his heirs.
- A suit was brought in the Circuit Court of Kentucky, a court of general equity jurisdiction, to enforce the contract.
- All of Gen. Scott's heirs were either properly served with process or voluntarily appeared, submitting themselves to the Kentucky court's jurisdiction.
- The Kentucky court issued a decree ordering the heirs to convey the Ohio lands to John Evans.
- When the heirs failed to convey the land, a master of the Kentucky court executed a deed to Evans on their behalf.
- The defendant in the current action succeeded to all the rights of John Evans, while the plaintiffs derive their claim of title from the heirs of Gen. Scott.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiffs, holding legal title derived from the heirs of Gen. Scott, filed an action in an Ohio trial court to recover possession of the land.
- The defendant, the successor to John Evans's interest, set up the Kentucky court's decree as an equitable defense to the plaintiffs' action.
- The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which is now ruling on the matter.
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Issue:
Does a decree from a court in one state, which has personal jurisdiction over the parties, ordering the conveyance of land located in another state, constitute a valid equitable defense in an action to recover that land in the state where it is located?
Opinions:
Majority - McIlvaine, J.
Yes, a decree from a sister state ordering the conveyance of land constitutes a valid equitable defense. Although a court in one state cannot issue a decree that directly operates to transfer title to land in another state (an action in rem), it can issue a decree that binds the parties over whom it has personal jurisdiction (an action in personam). The Kentucky court had personal jurisdiction over the heirs and its decree conclusively established the equitable rights between the parties, merging the original contract into a judicial determination that the heirs held the land in trust for Evans. Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Ohio courts must give the Kentucky decree the same effect it would have in Kentucky—as a conclusive record of Evans's equitable title. While the master's deed is a nullity and the Ohio court cannot enforce the Kentucky decree via contempt, the decree itself serves as a perfect equitable defense against the legal title asserted by the plaintiffs.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to equitable decrees concerning real property in other states. It establishes a crucial distinction between a court's inability to directly affect foreign land titles (in rem jurisdiction) and its power to bind the parties before it (in personam jurisdiction). The decision solidifies the principle that an in personam decree creates a binding legal obligation that other states must recognize as a conclusive determination of the parties' equitable rights. This allows a party who wins a specific performance case in one state to use that decree defensively (or as the basis for a new suit) to protect their interest in land located in another state.
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