Burke v. Kleiman
1934 Ill. App. LEXIS 148, 277 Ill. App. 519 (1934)
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Rule of Law:
A restrictive covenant will be enforced in equity, and will not be deemed abandoned, where violations of the covenant are not so numerous or significant as to indicate an abandonment of the original plan or to radically change the character of the neighborhood, thereby making enforcement inequitable.
Facts:
- On September 30, 1927, approximately 500 white property owners, representing over 95% of the frontage in a large Chicago neighborhood, entered into a restrictive agreement.
- The agreement prohibited the sale or lease of their properties to any person of the 'colored race' until January 1, 1948.
- The restricted area was extensive, covering 583 parcels over an area of nine city blocks by three city blocks.
- Both the predecessor in title to the complainant, Burke, and the predecessor in title to the defendant, Isaac Kleiman, were signatories to this agreement.
- On October 18, 1932, Isaac Kleiman and Sam Kleiman leased an apartment within the restricted area to James L. Hall, who is a Black man.
- The Kleimans and Hall had full knowledge of the restrictive agreement when they entered into the lease.
- At the time the lawsuit was initiated, there were only three other properties out of the 583 in the restricted area that were occupied by Black tenants in violation of the agreement.
Procedural Posture:
- Burke (complainant/appellee) filed a bill in the superior court of Cook County, a trial court, seeking an injunction to enforce the restrictive covenant against the Kleimans and Hall (defendants/appellants).
- The trial court chancellor, ruling on an agreed statement of facts, entered a decree granting the injunction in favor of Burke.
- The Kleimans and Hall, as appellants, appealed the trial court's decree to the Illinois Supreme Court.
- The Illinois Supreme Court, finding no freehold was involved, transferred the case to the Illinois Appellate Court for decision.
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Issue:
Does a change in conditions, consisting of a few violations of a racially restrictive covenant within a large restricted area, render the covenant unenforceable in equity?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Scanlan
No. The change in conditions does not render the covenant unenforceable because the violations were not significant enough to constitute an abandonment of the agreement or to radically alter the character of the neighborhood. For a court of equity to refuse enforcement of a restrictive covenant under the 'changed conditions' doctrine, the change in the property's character and environment must be radical. The court reasoned that three or four violations out of 583 parcels did not indicate an abandonment of the original plan or make enforcement inequitable. Distinguishing this case from precedents where changes were substantial, the court concluded that the minimal number of breaches did not defeat the purpose of the covenant or warrant a presumption of abandonment.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the high threshold required to invalidate a restrictive covenant under the 'changed conditions' doctrine. It establishes that minor, isolated breaches within a large restricted area are insufficient to prove abandonment or render the covenant unenforceable. The case is significant as it demonstrates the judicial willingness during this era to enforce racially restrictive covenants through equitable remedies like injunctions, treating them as valid private contracts. This legal framework was instrumental in maintaining housing segregation until the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) held that judicial enforcement of such covenants violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
