Burgess v. Taylor
2001 Ky. App. LEXIS 26, 44 S.W.3d 806, 2001 WL 236172 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress focuses on the outrageousness of the offender's conduct, not the subject of that conduct, and can therefore apply to actions involving an animal when the offender knows the owner is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress regarding that animal.
Facts:
- Judy Taylor owned two registered Appaloosa horses, Poco and P.J., for over a decade and loved them as if they were her children.
- Due to medical problems, Taylor could no longer care for the horses and entered a 'free-lease agreement' with Lisa and Jeff Burgess.
- Taylor explicitly told the Burgesses she wanted to retain ownership and control, visit the horses, and have them returned if the Burgesses could no longer keep them; the Burgesses agreed to these terms.
- On August 31, 1994, the Burgesses took possession of the horses, assuring Taylor they would be well cared for.
- Within a week, on September 6, 1994, Lisa Burgess sold Poco and P.J. to Eugene Jackson, a known slaughter-buyer, for $1,000.
- When Taylor called to visit her horses, Lisa Burgess lied, claiming she had given them to a man on a trail ride.
- The Burgesses then enlisted a friend, Kenny Randolph, to continue the deception by falsely telling Taylor he had the horses and sending her on a futile search for them at a fictitious location.
- In early October 1994, Taylor discovered through an investigation that her horses had been sold by the Burgesses and subsequently slaughtered in Texas in late September.
Procedural Posture:
- Judy Taylor filed a lawsuit in Jefferson Circuit Court (trial court) against Lisa and Jeff Burgess, Kenny Randolph, Eugene Jackson, and the Ryans.
- The claims against Randolph, Jackson, and the Ryans were dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction or improper venue.
- The case against the Burgesses proceeded to a jury trial.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of Taylor, finding the Burgesses liable for breach of agreement and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- The jury awarded Taylor $1,000 for breach of agreement, $50,000 in compensatory damages for outrageous conduct, and $75,000 in punitive damages.
- The Burgesses filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for a new trial, both of which the trial court denied.
- The Burgesses, as appellants, then appealed the judgment to the intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does secretly selling a person's beloved pet horses to a slaughter-buyer, in breach of a care agreement and while actively deceiving the owner about the horses' whereabouts, constitute 'extreme and outrageous' conduct sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress?
Opinions:
Majority - Schroder, Judge.
Yes. The defendants' conduct was sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court determined that the focus of the tort is on the character of the offender's conduct, not whether the subject of the conduct is a person or an animal. The court applied the four-element test for the tort of outrage: 1) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; 2) the conduct must be outrageous and intolerable; 3) there must be a causal connection between the conduct and the distress; and 4) the distress must be severe. The court found the Burgesses' conduct was reckless, as they knew Taylor's strong emotional attachment to the horses and should have known their actions would cause severe distress. The conduct was deemed outrageous because the Burgesses acted with knowledge of Taylor's 'peculiar susceptibility' to emotional distress concerning her horses, and then compounded the act by lying and cruelly sending her on a frantic, false search. The court concluded this behavior was 'heartless, flagrant, and outrageous,' directly causing Taylor's severe emotional distress, which was evidenced by panic attacks, depression, and other physical and mental health issues.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) is not limited to conduct directed at human beings. It establishes that actions involving animals can be the basis for an IIED claim, provided the defendant's conduct is sufficiently outrageous and they are aware of the plaintiff's particular emotional vulnerability. This ruling is significant because it allows for the recovery of emotional distress damages in cases of malicious harm to pets, moving beyond the traditional limitation of damages to the animal's fair market value. It reinforces the principle that the outrageousness of the defendant's actions is the central inquiry in an IIED claim.
