Burger v. Kemp, Warden
483 U.S. 776 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
A defense attorney's strategic decision not to investigate or present mitigating evidence is constitutionally permissible if supported by reasonable professional judgment. Furthermore, to establish ineffective assistance due to a conflict of interest, a defendant must show that counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that this conflict adversely affected the lawyer's performance.
Facts:
- Christopher Burger, a 17-year-old soldier, and his 20-year-old co-indictee, Thomas Stevens, called a cab driven by Roger Honeycutt.
- During the ride, they robbed Honeycutt, forced him to undress, and bound him.
- Stevens compelled Honeycutt to perform oral sodomy and then anally sodomized him.
- Burger and Stevens then placed the nude, blindfolded, and bound Honeycutt into the trunk of the taxi.
- They drove to the airport to pick up another soldier, James Botsford, and then dropped him off at their base.
- Afterward, Burger and Stevens drove to a pond.
- Burger opened the trunk, asked Honeycutt if he was alright, then closed it, put the car in gear, and let it roll into the pond, causing Honeycutt to drown.
- A psychologist testified that Burger had an IQ of 82 and functioned at the level of a 12-year-old child.
Procedural Posture:
- Christopher Burger was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in the Superior Court of Wayne County, Georgia (state trial court).
- On direct appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court (state's highest court) affirmed the conviction but vacated the death sentence.
- Following a new sentencing hearing in the trial court, Burger was again sentenced to death.
- The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the second death sentence.
- Burger filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, which rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claim but vacated the sentence on other grounds.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's vacatur and reinstated the death penalty.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Strickland v. Washington.
- The Court of Appeals remanded to the District Court, which again rejected the ineffective assistance claim, a decision the Court of Appeals then affirmed.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
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Issue:
Did the petitioner receive ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, either because his attorney's law partner represented his co-indictee, creating a conflict of interest, or because his attorney failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence at his capital sentencing hearing?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
No. The petitioner was not denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. To establish a Sixth Amendment violation based on a conflict of interest, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that this conflict adversely affected the lawyer's performance. The representation of co-indictees by law partners in separate trials does not create a per se conflict. Here, the separate trials reduced the potential for diverging interests, and the attorney's decision not to argue his client's lesser culpability on appeal was a reasonable strategic choice to 'winnow out weaker claims.' Similarly, counsel's decision not to present mitigating evidence of Burger's troubled background was a reasonable strategic choice based on a professional judgment that such evidence could be counterproductive by revealing violent tendencies or prior petty offenses, thereby harming his client's chances for a life sentence. Deference must be given to counsel's strategic choices made after a reasonable, even if not complete, investigation.
Dissenting - Justice Blackmun
Yes. The petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel on two grounds. First, there was an actual conflict of interest because the two law partners actively represented defendants with diametrically opposed defenses, namely blaming each other for the crime. This conflict adversely affected counsel's performance by preventing him from negotiating a plea bargain in exchange for Burger's testimony against Stevens and causing him to abandon the crucial 'lesser culpability' argument on appeal. Second, counsel's failure to investigate and present significant mitigating evidence of Burger's youth, diminished mental capacity, and troubled family background was professionally unreasonable. This inaction was not a strategic choice based on a thorough investigation but rather a failure that undermined the reliability of the capital sentencing proceeding.
Dissenting - Justice Powell
Yes. The petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney unreasonably failed to investigate and present available mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase. For a defendant who was 17, had an IQ of 82, and functioned at the level of a 12-year-old, evidence of a turbulent and violent childhood is 'extraordinarily germane' to the sentencing jury's decision. Counsel’s failure to comprehend the importance of this type of mitigating evidence, which does not have to be 'good,' was a professionally deficient performance. There is a reasonable probability that, had this evidence been presented, the jury would have concluded that the death penalty was not warranted.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high threshold for succeeding on ineffective assistance of counsel claims established in Strickland v. Washington. The Court's holding grants substantial deference to trial counsel's 'strategic choices,' even when based on limited investigation, as long as the decision to limit the investigation is itself reasonable. By rejecting the conflict of interest claim, the Court clarified that joint representation by law partners in separate trials is not presumptively prejudicial; a defendant must prove an actual conflict had a tangible, adverse effect on the representation. The case makes it more difficult for defendants to challenge their convictions or sentences based on counsel's tactical decisions regarding the presentation of mitigating evidence in capital cases.
