Bunting v. Hogsett
21 A. 31, 1891 Pa. LEXIS 1004, 139 Pa. 363 (1891)
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Rule of Law:
The negligence of a common carrier is not imputed to a passenger who is injured by the concurrent negligence of the carrier and a third party. The passenger is not barred from recovering damages from the third-party tortfeasor.
Facts:
- Robert Hogsett owned a furnace that used a small 'dinkey engine' on a private track which crossed the main line of the Southwest Pennsylvania railroad twice.
- On October 13, 1883, Henry C. Bunting was a passenger on a train of the Southwest Pennsylvania railroad.
- An engineer employed by Hogsett negligently operated the dinkey engine, causing it to collide with the passenger train at the first crossing.
- This initial collision derailed a truck on the passenger train but caused no personal injuries.
- Fearing for their lives, the dinkey engine's engineer and fireman jumped off after reversing the engine and shutting off the steam.
- The jar from the collision, however, reopened the dinkey engine's throttle, causing the unmanned engine to start moving on its own.
- The dinkey engine traveled along its track to the second crossing, where it collided with the middle coach of the passenger train.
- Bunting was riding in the middle coach and sustained the injuries for which he sued in this second collision.
Procedural Posture:
- Henry C. Bunting sued Robert Hogsett in a trial court to recover damages for personal injuries.
- The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Bunting.
- A judgment was entered on the verdict.
- The defendant, Hogsett, appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
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Issue:
Is the negligence of a common carrier imputed to a passenger, thereby barring the passenger from recovering damages from a third party whose negligence also contributed to the injury?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Clark
No. The negligence of a common carrier cannot be imputed to a passenger to prevent recovery from a negligent third party. The court explicitly overrules prior precedent that followed the English doctrine of Thorogood v. Bryan, which identified the passenger with the carrier. The court reasons that there is no logical basis for this identification, as the passenger has no control over the carrier's driver. Public policy supports holding all negligent parties accountable; if a person is injured by the joint negligence of two parties, both are jointly and severally liable. Furthermore, the court held that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. The second collision was a direct and foreseeable consequence of the first, as the engineer's initial negligent act set in motion an unbroken chain of events leading to the injury, without any new, independent, and self-operating intervening cause.
Analysis:
This decision marks a significant shift in Pennsylvania tort law by explicitly rejecting the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence for passengers. By overruling Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler and disavowing the English case of Thorogood v. Bryan, the court aligned Pennsylvania with the growing majority of American jurisdictions. This precedent ensures that innocent passengers injured by the combined fault of their carrier and a third party can seek full recovery from the third party, preventing tortfeasors from escaping liability by blaming the carrier. The case solidifies the principle that liability should follow fault and that a passenger's right to recovery is independent of any negligence by their carrier, over whom they have no control.
