No, the grandma didn't really give permission. When police say they have a warrant, it's like saying 'we're coming in no matter what you say.' That's not asking for permission - it's telling someone what's going to happen. The grandma only said yes because she thought she had no choice. When someone feels forced to say yes, that's not real permission. So the search was against the rules, and the gun shouldn't have been used in court.

I agree the grandma didn't really give permission. She only said yes right after the officer said he had a warrant. That made her think the police were coming in no matter what. Also, the lawyers for the government said in court they were only using her permission as their reason, not any warrant. They can't change their story now. Using that gun as evidence was a big mistake that hurt Bumper's case.

I think the grandma did give real permission. She said in court that she let them search because she wanted to - she believed her grandson didn't do anything wrong and had nothing to hide. We shouldn't ignore what she said just because we think differently. Also, even if finding the gun was a mistake, there was so much other proof that Bumper did the crime that he should still be found guilty.

We should send this case back to the lower courts to check something important. Maybe the police really did have a proper warrant. If they did, then the search was okay from the start, and it doesn't matter what the grandma said or thought. We should find out if there was a real warrant before we say Bumper should go free.

No, the search violated the Fourth Amendment. Mrs. Leath only 'consented' because the police lied about having a warrant. That's not real voluntary consent. The police have to prove she freely agreed to the search without being bullied or tricked. They can't just say 'we have a warrant' without showing it. That's coercion, not consent. It was wrong to let the gun be used as evidence against Bumper. His conviction is overturned.

Bumper's conviction should stand. Mrs. Leath voluntarily agreed to the search because she wanted to show she and her grandson were innocent. Even without the gun, the other evidence, especially the victims identifying Bumper, clearly proves he's guilty. The Court shouldn't automatically overturn guilty verdicts just because of a technical rule violation if there's plenty of other proof of guilt.

If you agree to a search after the police say they have a warrant, it's reasonable to assume your agreement depends on them actually having a valid warrant. The case should go back to the lower courts to check if there was a real, valid warrant. If not, Bumper's conviction should only stand if using the gun as evidence was harmless.

Agrees with the majority that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because Mrs. Leath didn't truly consent voluntarily. Disagrees with the idea of upholding the conviction anyway because Bumper is guilty and the gun evidence wasn't that important. What matters is whether guilt was proven with evidence that was constitutionally allowed, not whether we think he did it. Here, the gun linked Bumper to the crime, so we can't say it didn't matter.

When the government "seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search,[it] has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given."

—the burden of proving consent "cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority

When the State relies on a consent to justify a search, the State must prove that the consent was freely and voluntarily given.

—the US Supreme Court considered whether or not a woman consented to officers' searching her house after they told her that they had a search warrant.

When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion—albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent

—law enforcement personnel obtained permission of the homeowner to search by asserting that they had a warrant to search.

—noting that defendant accepted that his grandmother, as joint tenant of their home and as owner of the rifle in question, had authority to consent to a search of their home

No, consent to a search is not voluntary when it is given in response to an officer's claim of possessing a warrant. The prosecution bears the burden of proving that consent was freely and voluntarily given, and this burden cannot be met by showing mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. When an officer claims to have a warrant, they announce that the occupant has no right to resist the search. This situation is inherently coercive, and where there is coercion, there cannot be valid consent. Therefore, the search was unconstitutional, and the rifle should have been suppressed.

I agree with the majority's conclusion that consent was not voluntary. Mrs. Leath's response cannot be considered voluntary consent because it was given immediately after a sheriff announced he had a search warrant, which implies a lawful right to enter regardless of her wishes. The prosecution made a strategic decision at trial to explicitly renounce any reliance on the warrant itself, so it cannot now attempt to justify the search on that basis. The admission of the rifle was not harmless error, as the tangible evidence could have significantly influenced the jury's verdict on the critical issue of identity.

I disagree with the majority. Mrs. Leath's consent was voluntary. The record shows she freely permitted the search, testifying that 'it was all my own free will' because she believed in her grandson's innocence and had nothing to hide. The Court should not substitute its own interpretation for the clear testimony of the witness and the factual finding of the trial judge. Furthermore, even if the rifle was admitted in error, the other evidence of guilt, particularly the positive identifications by the two victims, was so overwhelming that the conviction should stand under the harmless error doctrine.

The consent should be viewed as conditioned on the existence of a valid warrant. Instead of reversing the conviction, the Court should vacate the judgment and remand the case to the state courts. This would allow for a determination of whether the search warrant the officers claimed to possess was, in fact, valid. If a valid warrant existed, the search would be constitutional regardless of the consent issue, and the evidence would be admissible.

Yes. The search was unconstitutional because the consent was not voluntary; it was given after the officers falsely claimed to have a warrant. The government has the burden of proving that consent was freely and voluntarily given, and this burden cannot be met by showing mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search under a warrant, he announces that the occupant has no right to resist. Where there is coercion, there cannot be consent. Mrs. Leath did not voluntarily consent to the search, and it was constitutional error to admit the rifle into evidence against Bumper. Because the rifle was damaging evidence with respect to all three charges, its admission was not harmless error. The judgment is reversed and the case remanded.

The conviction should be upheld. Based on the facts, Mrs. Leath voluntarily consented to the search out of a desire to prove her own and her grandson's innocence. Even if the rifle should not have been admitted, the other evidence, including the unequivocal testimony of the two victims identifying Bumper as their assailant, overwhelmingly demonstrates his guilt. The Court should not automatically reverse convictions for violations of the exclusionary rule where other evidence conclusively proves guilt.

When consent is given after police say they have a warrant, it is reasonable to view the consent as conditioned on there being a valid warrant, absent clear proof otherwise. The case should be vacated and remanded to the state courts to determine if there was a valid warrant. If there was no valid warrant, the conviction should be reversed unless the admission of the rifle was harmless error.

Agrees with the majority that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because Mrs. Leath's consent was not voluntary. Rejects the idea that the conviction should be upheld on the grounds that Bumper was guilty anyway and the admission of the rifle was harmless error. The question is not whether the defendant actually committed the crimes, but whether the error was such that it cannot be said guilt was adjudicated on the basis of constitutionally admissible evidence. Here, the rifle provided a tangible link between Bumper and the crime and cannot be said to have been harmless surplusage.

Bumper v. North Carolina

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Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

Why This Case Matters

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