Bullcoming v. New Mexico
2011 U.S. LEXIS 4790, 564 U.S. 647, 180 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2011)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause requires that if an out-of-court statement is testimonial in nature and introduced against an accused at trial, the witness who made the statement must be unavailable, and the accused must have had a prior opportunity for cross-examination; surrogate testimony from an analyst who did not perform or observe the test reported in a testimonial certification does not satisfy this requirement.
Facts:
- In August 2005, Donald Bullcoming rear-ended a pickup truck at an intersection in Farmington, New Mexico.
- The truckdriver noticed Bullcoming’s bloodshot eyes, smelled alcohol, and asked his wife to call the police.
- Bullcoming left the scene before police arrived but was soon apprehended by an officer who observed him fail field sobriety tests.
- Bullcoming refused to take a breath test, so police obtained a warrant authorizing a blood-alcohol analysis.
- A sample of Bullcoming’s blood was drawn at a local hospital and sent to the New Mexico Department of Health, Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD).
- SLD forensic analyst Curtis Caylor tested the sample and recorded a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.21 grams per hundred milliliters in a 'Report of Blood Alcohol Analysis,' certifying that he received the sample intact and followed the specified procedures.
- The reported BAC of 0.21 was well above the threshold for aggravated DWI in New Mexico (0.16 g/100ml).
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Donald Bullcoming with aggravated driving while intoxicated (DWI).
- During the jury trial, the State announced it would not call SLD analyst Curtis Caylor as a witness because he was on unpaid leave, proposing to introduce his blood-alcohol report as a business record through another SLD scientist, Gerasimos Razatos.
- Bullcoming’s defense counsel objected, arguing that admitting Caylor's finding without his testimony would violate the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.
- The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the SLD report as a business record.
- The jury convicted Bullcoming of aggravated DWI.
- Bullcoming appealed, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, concluding that the blood alcohol report was non-testimonial and prepared routinely with guarantees of trustworthiness.
- While Bullcoming’s appeal was pending before the New Mexico Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.
- In light of Melendez-Diaz, the New Mexico Supreme Court acknowledged that the blood-alcohol report introduced at Bullcoming’s trial qualified as testimonial evidence.
- However, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the admission of the report did not violate the Confrontation Clause, reasoning that Caylor 'was a mere scrivener' and SLD analyst Razatos's live testimony satisfied constitutional requirements as an expert witness regarding the gas chromatograph machine and laboratory procedures.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question of surrogate testimony for forensic reports.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the Confrontation Clause permit the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification, made for the purpose of proving a particular fact, through the in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the certification or personally perform or observe the test reported in the certification?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
No, the Confrontation Clause does not permit the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification through the in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign, perform, or observe the test reported in the certification. Building on Crawford v. Washington and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Court reiterated that testimonial statements of absent witnesses are admissible only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. The blood-alcohol report in this case was testimonial because its primary purpose was to establish facts for a criminal prosecution, similar to the affidavits in Melendez-Diaz. Caylor's certification involved more than just transcribing a machine-generated number; he certified to receiving the sample intact, checking numbers, performing a specific test, and adhering to protocol, which are 'representations relating to past events and human actions not revealed in raw, machine-produced data' and are 'meet for cross-examination.' The reliability of the report or the fact that the certifying analyst merely transcribed results from a machine does not overcome the Confrontation Clause's mandate for cross-examination. Surrogate testimony from Razatos, who neither participated in nor observed Caylor’s analysis, could not expose any errors, incompetence, or dishonesty on Caylor's part. The Sixth Amendment's text does not allow for open-ended exceptions based on judicial notions of fairness or adequate substitute procedures. The State bears the burden of producing the witness or demonstrating unavailability and prior cross-examination, not the defendant to seek retesting. The absence of an oath also does not render the report non-testimonial, as the form and purpose make it clear it was created for evidentiary purposes.
Dissenting - Justice Kennedy
No, the Court's extension of Melendez-Diaz is a serious misstep, as the Confrontation Clause should permit admission of scientific findings when a knowledgeable laboratory representative testifies, explains processes, and is cross-examined, even if they did not personally perform the specific test. The procedures followed, where a knowledgeable lab representative testifies, are consistent with the Confrontation Clause and fairness. Unlike Melendez-Diaz where findings were based solely on documents, here, an in-court witness (Razatos) was present to explain the lab's methods, processes, and the report, subject to full cross-examination. The certifying analyst's role (Caylor) was minimal, akin to a 'mere scrivener,' simply transcribing machine results as part of a multi-participant scientific process. The information was automatically generated by a gas chromatograph, with objective results reported to both sides. Requiring the specific technician who filled out a form to testify is a 'hollow formality' when a qualified expert from the lab is available for cross-examination about the procedures and reliability of the test. The Crawford line of cases incorrectly treats reliability as a reason to exclude evidence, rather than a goal to ensure. This decision will impose an undue burden on prosecutors and state forensic labs, disrupting criminal procedures, and displacing states from developing sensible evidentiary rules.
Concurring - Justice Sotomayor
Yes, the trial court erred by admitting the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) report because its primary purpose was evidentiary, making it testimonial, and thus requiring confrontation with the actual analyst. Justice Sotomayor concurred, emphasizing that the BAC report is testimonial because its 'primary purpose' is evidentiary, aligning with Michigan v. Bryant and Melendez-Diaz. Business records created primarily for use at trial are not admissible without confrontation. The formality of the certification, even without notarization, also indicates its evidentiary purpose. She clarified the limited reach of the Court's opinion by highlighting what this case is not: (1) not a case where the State suggested an alternative primary purpose for the report (e.g., medical treatment); (2) not a case where the testifying person was a supervisor with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the test (Razatos had no involvement); (3) not a case where an expert gave an independent opinion about underlying reports not themselves admitted into evidence; and (4) not a case where only machine-generated raw data was introduced in conjunction with an expert. The decision doesn't cover these other factual scenarios.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, particularly as applied to forensic evidence. It solidifies that the 'testimonial' nature of a report, determined by its primary purpose for use in litigation, triggers the right to confront the specific analyst who created the certification, not merely a surrogate who is familiar with laboratory procedures. This ruling prevents the prosecution from using expert testimony about general laboratory practices to circumvent the direct confrontation of the individual responsible for the specific analysis, thereby limiting the types of forensic evidence that can be introduced without the testimony of the specific analyst involved. It underscores the importance of the 'crucible of cross-examination' for testimonial statements and places a burden on the prosecution to ensure the availability of the original analyst or to retest samples.
