Buford v. Houtz
10 S. Ct. 305, 133 U.S. 320, 1890 U.S. LEXIS 1914 (1890)
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Rule of Law:
There is an implied license from the United States government for the public to graze stock on unenclosed public lands, and a private owner of unenclosed, interspersed tracts of land cannot obtain an injunction to prevent others' livestock from incidentally trespassing on their land while grazing on the adjacent public domain.
Facts:
- Promontory Stock Ranch Company (Plaintiffs) owned approximately 350,000 acres of unfenced land in Utah.
- The plaintiffs' land consisted of scattered, odd-numbered sections obtained through a railroad grant, forming a 'checkerboard' pattern with even-numbered sections owned by the U.S. government as public domain.
- The entire area, spanning roughly 1,440 square miles, was arid, unenclosed, and primarily valuable for grazing livestock.
- Plaintiffs used the entire mixed area of private and public land to graze their 20,000 head of cattle.
- John S. Houtz and several other defendants were sheep ranchers who collectively owned over 200,000 sheep.
- The defendants grazed their herds of sheep on the unenclosed public domain lands that were interspersed with the plaintiffs' private lands.
- In the course of grazing on the public lands, the defendants' sheep would inevitably wander onto and graze upon the plaintiffs' unfenced private property.
- Defendants asserted they had an implied license from the government to graze on the public lands, and this right necessarily included their sheep crossing onto the adjacent, unfenced private tracts.
Procedural Posture:
- M. B. Buford and others, as the Promontory Stock Ranch Company, filed a bill for an injunction against John S. Houtz and other defendants in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah Territory (trial court).
- The defendants filed a demurrer, arguing the bill did not state a sufficient cause of action.
- The trial court sustained the demurrer and rendered a decree dismissing the bill.
- The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah (intermediate appellate court).
- The Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah affirmed the trial court's decree.
- The plaintiffs (appellants) then appealed that decision to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a landowner who owns scattered, unfenced tracts of land interspersed with public domain have the right to an injunction to prevent others from grazing their animals on the public land, where such grazing results in the animals wandering onto the landowner's private tracts?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Miller
No. A landowner holding scattered, unfenced tracts interspersed with public domain cannot obtain an injunction to prevent others from grazing animals on the public land, even if those animals incidentally trespass onto the private tracts. The court found no equity in the plaintiffs' bill, reasoning that they were attempting to use their ownership of one-third of the land to monopolize the entire area, including the two-thirds that constituted the public domain. The court rejected the English common law rule that requires an owner to keep their animals fenced in, stating it is inapplicable to the conditions of the American West. Instead, it recognized an implied license, arising from nearly a century of custom, for the public to use open and unenclosed public lands for grazing. The prevailing custom and law in the region is a 'fence-out' rule, where a landowner must construct a fence to protect their property from roaming livestock, rather than a 'fence-in' rule requiring animal owners to restrain their stock. Granting the injunction would subvert this long-standing custom and allow private parties to control vast areas of public land.
Analysis:
This landmark decision formally established the 'implied license' doctrine for grazing on the public domain and rejected the English common law 'fence-in' rule for the unenclosed lands of the American West. By endorsing the 'fence-out' principle, the Court affirmed a long-standing regional custom and prevented owners of 'checkerboard' land grants from using trespass law to monopolize vast tracts of public land. The ruling profoundly shaped property and resource law in the Western United States, establishing a default rule that public lands are open to common grazing unless specifically forbidden by the government. This precedent remains a foundational principle in public land law, influencing subsequent legislation and disputes over grazing rights.
