Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers
1976 U.S. LEXIS 110, 428 U.S. 397, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976)
Rule of Law:
A federal court may not enjoin a sympathy strike, even if the collective bargaining agreement contains an express no-strike clause and an arbitration clause that covers disputes over the interpretation of the no-strike clause, because such a strike is not "over an arbitrable grievance" as required by the narrow exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act established in Boys Markets.
Facts:
- Buffalo Forge Co. (employer) operates three plant and office facilities in Buffalo, N.Y.
- The United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, and its Local Unions No. 1874 and No. 3732 (Union) represent the P&M (production and maintenance) employees at these locations.
- The employer and the Union are parties to collective-bargaining agreements containing identical no-strike clauses and grievance/arbitration procedures for disputes over contract interpretation.
- The United Steelworkers and two other locals were certified to represent the employer’s O&T (office clerical-technical) employees at the same locations and began negotiations for their first collective-bargaining agreement.
- On November 16, 1974, after several months of negotiations, the O&T employees went on strike and established picket lines at all three locations.
- On November 18, 1974, P&M employees at one plant refused to cross the O&T picket line for the day.
- On November 21, 1974, P&M employees, at the Union's direction, honored the O&T picket line and stopped work at all three plants.
Procedural Posture:
- Buffalo Forge Co. filed a complaint in District Court under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, claiming the P&M work stoppage violated the no-strike clause and requesting damages, a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and an order compelling arbitration of any "underlying dispute."
- The District Court denied the temporary restraining order, found the P&M work stoppage was a sympathy action, and held itself forbidden to issue an injunction by § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act because the strike was not over an "arbitrable grievance" within the Boys Markets exception.
- Buffalo Forge Co. appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that enjoining this strike, which was not "over a grievance which the union has agreed to arbitrate," was not permitted by the Boys Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
- The Supreme Court granted Buffalo Forge Co.'s petition for a writ of certiorari due to a division among the Courts of Appeals on the question of whether such a strike may be enjoined.
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Issue:
Does a federal court have the authority under Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, as interpreted by Boys Markets, to enjoin a sympathy strike pending an arbitrator's decision on whether the strike violates an express no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice White
No, a federal court may not enjoin a sympathy strike pending an arbitrator's decision as to whether the strike is forbidden by an express no-strike clause in the collective-bargaining contract. The Court held that the narrow exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition on injunctions in labor disputes, established in Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970), applies only when the strike is over an arbitrable grievance. In this case, the sympathy strike was not over any dispute between the P&M Union and the employer that was subject to the arbitration provisions of their contract; rather, it was in support of sister unions. While the legality of the sympathy strike under the no-strike clause was itself an arbitrable issue, enjoining the strike pending arbitration of this contractual interpretation would require federal courts to hold hearings, make findings of fact, and interpret the contract, a role reserved for arbitrators under the Steelworkers Trilogy (Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U. S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp., 363 U. S. 593 (1960)). Such judicial intervention would "cut deeply into the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act" and expand judicial authority beyond the enforcement of promises to arbitrate, which was the limit of Boys Markets. The quid pro quo for the employer's promise to arbitrate is the union's obligation not to strike over issues subject to the arbitration machinery; this particular sympathy strike did not deny or evade an obligation to arbitrate an underlying dispute.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Stevens
Yes, a federal court should have the authority to enjoin a sympathy strike, especially when it clearly violates an express no-strike clause, pending an arbitrator's decision. Justice Stevens argued that the majority's holding improperly severs the union's quid pro quo (the promise not to strike) for the employer's agreement to arbitrate. The Norris-LaGuardia Act's ban on injunctions was primarily aimed at protecting union organization and collective bargaining, not at preventing judicial enforcement of freely negotiated collective-bargaining agreements. Boys Markets already accommodated Norris-LaGuardia with § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act to enforce arbitration promises, recognizing that a no-strike pledge is the "principal and most expeditious method" for uninterrupted operation. If the no-strike clause clearly prohibits sympathy strikes, an injunction would not usurp the arbitrator's function but rather enforce the parties' bargain pending the arbitrator's decision. Denying injunctive relief for clear contract violations undermines the employer's incentive to agree to binding arbitration. He proposed stringent conditions for such injunctions, including convincing evidence that the strike clearly violates the no-strike clause, immediate submission to expedited arbitration, and satisfaction of ordinary equitable principles, to ensure fairness and efficiency.
Analysis:
This case significantly narrowed the scope of federal court injunctions in labor disputes under the Boys Markets exception. By distinguishing between strikes over an arbitrable grievance and strikes whose legality is an arbitrable grievance, the Court reinforced the strong anti-injunction policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, emphasizing judicial restraint in interpreting collective bargaining agreements. The decision limits the remedies available to employers faced with sympathy strikes, potentially making explicit 'no-sympathy-strike' clauses more crucial in future collective bargaining to secure injunctive relief. It underscores the primary role of arbitration, not courts, in resolving disputes over contractual interpretation, even when the dispute involves the scope of a no-strike clause itself.
