Buckley v. Valeo
424 U.S. 1 (1976)
Rule of Law:
Under the First Amendment, the government may limit financial contributions to political campaigns to serve the compelling interest of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, but it may not limit campaign expenditures, independent expenditures, or a candidate's use of personal funds, as such restrictions are direct and substantial restraints on political speech. Additionally, a federal commission vested with executive enforcement, rulemaking, and adjudicative powers is unconstitutional if its members are not appointed in conformity with the Appointments Clause of Article II.
Facts:
- In 1974, Congress amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to reform the financing of federal election campaigns.
- The Act imposed a $1,000 limit on individual contributions to a single candidate per election, with an overall annual contribution limit of $25,000 per individual.
- The Act set limits on total campaign spending by candidates for federal office.
- The Act also limited expenditures by candidates from their own personal or family funds, with ceilings of $50,000 for President, $35,000 for Senate, and $25,000 for House races.
- The Act restricted independent expenditures by individuals and groups 'relative to a clearly identified candidate' to $1,000 per year.
- The law mandated public disclosure of the names and occupations of contributors who gave more than $100 and required detailed record-keeping for contributions over $10.
- The Act created an eight-member Federal Election Commission (FEC) to administer and enforce the law, with four of its six voting members appointed by congressional leadership.
- A diverse group of plaintiffs, including Senator James L. Buckley, presidential candidate Eugene McCarthy, and various political parties and conservative organizations, challenged the constitutionality of these provisions.
Procedural Posture:
- A group of plaintiffs, including Senator James Buckley and former Senator Eugene McCarthy, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
- The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that major provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act were unconstitutional and an injunction against their enforcement.
- Pursuant to a special provision in the Act, the District Court certified the constitutional questions directly to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for en banc review.
- A majority of the Court of Appeals upheld most of the Act's provisions, finding a compelling governmental interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process.
- The plaintiffs (appellants) appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, which limits political contributions and expenditures, establishes public financing for presidential campaigns, requires financial disclosures, and creates the Federal Election Commission to enforce the law, violate the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and association and the Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution?
Opinions:
Per curiam - The Court
Yes, in part, and no, in part. The Act's limitations on campaign expenditures and the method of appointing the Federal Election Commission are unconstitutional, but the limitations on contributions, the disclosure and reporting requirements, and the public financing system are constitutionally permissible. The Court distinguished between contributions and expenditures, finding that while both implicate First Amendment rights, the government's interest in regulating them differs significantly. Contribution Limitations: These provisions are constitutional. The Court found that the government has a compelling interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption that can arise from large financial contributions. While limiting contributions does marginally impinge on the contributor's freedom of association, it is a permissible restriction because it does not significantly restrain the contributor's ability to express political views. A contribution is a generalized, symbolic expression of support, and the government's interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process outweighs this limited burden. Expenditure Limitations: These provisions are unconstitutional. The Court held that expenditure limits impose direct and substantial restrictions on the quantity of political speech, which lies at the core of the First Amendment. Unlike contributions, expenditures for political communication directly translate into speech. The Court rejected the government's rationale of equalizing the relative ability of individuals to influence elections, stating that 'the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.' This holding applies to the overall campaign expenditure ceilings, the $1,000 limit on independent expenditures, and the limits on a candidate's use of personal funds, all of which were found to be unconstitutional restraints on political expression. Disclosure and Reporting Requirements: These provisions are constitutional. They serve substantial governmental interests by informing the electorate about sources of campaign funding, deterring actual corruption, and aiding in the enforcement of contribution limits. Although compelled disclosure can burden First Amendment rights of association, the Court found these governmental interests sufficient to outweigh the potential for infringement, particularly since the plaintiffs failed to show a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals against contributors. Public Financing of Presidential Campaigns: This scheme is constitutional. It is a valid exercise of Congress's power under the General Welfare Clause. The system does not abridge speech but rather uses public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion. The eligibility requirements for minor parties, which are based on past electoral support, do not invidiously discriminate, as Congress has a legitimate interest in not funding 'hopeless candidacies' and avoiding the proliferation of splinter parties. Federal Election Commission: The composition of the FEC violates the Appointments Clause of Article II, § 2, cl. 2. Because the Commission has extensive executive powers, including enforcement and rulemaking authority, its members are 'Officers of the United States' who must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Act's provision allowing for the appointment of four of the six voting members by congressional leaders is an unconstitutional violation of the principle of separation of powers.
Analysis:
Buckley v. Valeo established the foundational constitutional framework for modern campaign finance regulation. Its core distinction between contributions and expenditures has been the controlling doctrine for decades. The holding that expenditure limits are a direct restraint on speech ('money is speech') opened the door for wealthy individuals and, later, corporations and unions to make unlimited independent expenditures, leading to the creation of Super PACs. Conversely, the Court's approval of contribution limits legitimized government efforts to curb the influence of large donors. The decision's invalidation of the FEC's appointment structure reinforced the separation of powers by affirming the President's central role in appointing officials who execute federal law.
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