Buckbee v. United Gas Pipe Line Co. Inc.
1990 WL 55859, 561 So. 2d 76 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
A declarant's out-of-court statement of future intent is admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule to prove both the declarant's intent and that the declarant subsequently acted in conformity with that intent. The erroneous exclusion of such evidence on a central, dispositive issue like contributory negligence constitutes prejudicial, not harmless, error.
Facts:
- William Buckbee, a maintenance foreman for Lake Charles Refining Co. (LCR), was tasked with reassembling a used box heater that LCR had acquired from United Gas Pipe Line Company Inc.
- The heater contained residual flammable 'absorbing oil' from its prior use by United Gas.
- Buckbee and his co-worker, Roosevelt Vincent, attempted for two hours to remove a tapered metal plug from the heater using 'cold' methods like wrenches and sledgehammers, but were unsuccessful.
- Buckbee told Vincent he was going to the plant office to get permission to apply heat to the plug.
- Buckbee then left the scaffold, went into the plant office for approximately ten minutes, and returned.
- Upon returning to the scaffold, Buckbee told Vincent that he had obtained permission to apply heat.
- Buckbee and Vincent then used an acetylene torch on the plug, which caused the residual oil inside the heater to ignite, resulting in a fire and explosion.
- The explosion severely burned both men, and William Buckbee died from his injuries three weeks later.
Procedural Posture:
- Vera Buckbee, on behalf of herself, her minor child, and the estate of her deceased husband William Buckbee, sued United Gas Pipe Line Company Inc. in a Louisiana trial court for negligence.
- The Buckbee plaintiffs' suit was consolidated for trial with a separate suit filed by Roosevelt Vincent, Buckbee's injured co-worker.
- During the jury trial, the court made several key evidentiary rulings, including excluding certain testimony from Vincent regarding Buckbee's statements immediately before the accident.
- The jury returned a verdict finding United Gas negligent but also finding William Buckbee contributorily negligent, which, under the law at the time, completely barred his family from recovering damages.
- The jury found co-worker Roosevelt Vincent was not negligent and awarded him damages.
- The Buckbee plaintiffs (appellants) appealed the judgment to the Louisiana Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding the excluded statements were inadmissible hearsay and, alternatively, that any error in excluding them was harmless.
- The Buckbee plaintiffs then successfully petitioned the Supreme Court of Louisiana for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the erroneous exclusion of a decedent's out-of-court statement of intent to seek permission for a work-related action constitute prejudicial error when that statement is central to determining the decedent's alleged contributory negligence?
Opinions:
Majority - Calogero, Chief Justice
Yes, the erroneous exclusion of a decedent's out-of-court statement of intent constitutes prejudicial error when that statement is central to determining the decedent's alleged contributory negligence. The court analyzed three key evidentiary rulings. First, the testimony of Buckbee's supervisors that they had previously warned him to only remove the plug 'cold' was properly admitted. This was not hearsay because it was offered not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to show its effect on Buckbee's state of mind—that he was on notice of the safety procedure. Second, the court held that Buckbee's statement upon returning from the office that he had received permission was properly excluded. This was hearsay offered to prove its truth, and it did not qualify for the residual exception because it lacked sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, as it was equally plausible Buckbee had been denied permission and was misrepresenting the fact to his co-worker. Finally, and most critically, the court found that the trial court erred in excluding Buckbee's first statement that he was going to seek permission. This statement was admissible hearsay under the well-recognized 'state of mind' exception for a declaration of future intent. Such a statement is admissible to prove the declarant's intent and as circumstantial evidence that the declarant acted on that intent. Because this excluded evidence was directly relevant to the central issue of Buckbee's contributory negligence and would have countered the defendant's narrative that he was reckless, its exclusion was prejudicial error that tainted the jury's verdict.
Dissenting in part - Watson, Justice
No, both statements should have been admitted. While concurring in the remand, the dissent argues that Buckbee's second statement—that he had obtained permission—was also admissible. This statement should have been allowed under the 'present sense impression' exception as a contemporaneous explanatory statement. The statement was reliable because Buckbee had no reason to misrepresent the fact at that moment. It also was a declaration of his state of mind, explaining why he proceeded to apply heat, and its relevance to the critical issue of contributory negligence should not render it inadmissible.
Analysis:
This decision provides a clear application of Louisiana's hearsay rules, particularly reinforcing the scope of the state-of-mind exception for declarations of intent. It establishes that such statements are admissible not just to prove the intent itself, but also as circumstantial evidence that the declarant acted in conformity with that intent. The court's analysis distinguishes this from a statement of memory or belief about a past event (e.g., 'I received permission'), which remains inadmissible hearsay without strong independent corroboration. The ruling also solidifies the standard for prejudicial versus harmless error, emphasizing that excluding evidence that is central to a case's dispositive issue and creates a one-sided narrative for the jury requires reversal and a new, independent review of the facts by the appellate court.
