Buck v. Kuykendall
267 U.S. 307, 45 S. Ct. 324, 1925 U.S. LEXIS 373 (1925)
Rule of Law:
A state cannot prohibit common carriers from using its highways for exclusively interstate commerce based on a determination that the public is already adequately served, as such a regulation is a direct burden on interstate commerce and violates the Commerce Clause.
Facts:
- A.E. Buck, a citizen of Washington, sought to operate an auto stage line for hire to transport passengers and express exclusively between Seattle, Washington, and Portland, Oregon.
- Buck obtained the required license from the state of Oregon to operate his line.
- He complied with all Washington state laws related to motor vehicles, their owners, and their drivers.
- Buck applied to Washington's Director of Public Works for a certificate of public convenience and necessity, which was required by state law to operate as a common carrier over a regular route.
- Washington state officials refused to grant Buck the certificate.
- The reason for the denial was that the territory between Seattle and Portland was deemed to be already adequately served by existing steam railroad and certified auto stage lines.
Procedural Posture:
- Buck filed suit against Kuykendall, the Washington Director of Public Works, in the federal district court for the western district of Washington, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the state law.
- A three-judge panel heard Buck's application for a preliminary injunction and denied it.
- A subsequent application for an injunction made after amending the bill was also denied.
- The District Judge then heard a motion to dismiss the amended bill and entered a final decree dismissing it.
- Buck, as the appellant, appealed the final decree directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a state law that prohibits common carriers from using state highways for interstate commerce without first obtaining a certificate of 'public convenience and necessity,' where the certificate is denied based on the state's determination that existing services are adequate, violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brandeis
Yes. A state law that allows officials to deny a certificate of public convenience and necessity to an interstate carrier based on the adequacy of existing services is an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce. The primary purpose of the Washington statute is not to promote safety or conserve the highways, but to prohibit competition. By determining who may use the highways rather than the manner of their use, the state is impermissibly regulating interstate commerce itself. The state's test for granting a certificate—the existence of adequate facilities for conducting interstate commerce—is a matter peculiarly within the province of federal action. Such a state regulation does not merely burden but directly obstructs interstate commerce, which is forbidden by the Commerce Clause.
Dissenting - Justice McReynolds
This opinion notes that Justice McReynolds dissented, referencing a separate opinion in a subsequent case.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a crucial distinction between permissible and impermissible state regulation of highways used in interstate commerce. While states retain police power to regulate for safety and conservation (e.g., speed limits, vehicle weight), they cannot engage in economic protectionism by controlling market entry. The ruling clarifies that a state's authority over its own infrastructure does not extend to regulating the flow or adequacy of interstate commerce itself. This precedent significantly limited the states' ability to create local monopolies for transportation and reinforced the federal government's broad authority under the Commerce Clause.
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