Buck v. Davis
580 U. S. ____ (2017) (2017)
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Rule of Law:
The introduction of expert testimony by a defendant's own counsel that expressly links the defendant's race to their future dangerousness in a capital sentencing proceeding constitutes an extraordinary circumstance sufficient to justify reopening a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).
Facts:
- On July 30, 1995, Duane Buck, armed with a rifle and shotgun, went to the home of his former girlfriend, Debra Gardner.
- Buck shot and killed Gardner and her friend, Kenneth Butler, and shot and wounded his own stepsister, Phyllis Taylor.
- After being arrested, Buck was observed laughing at the crime scene and in the patrol car, and he told an officer that Gardner "got what she deserved."
- During the penalty phase of Buck's capital murder trial, the jury was required to determine whether there was a probability that Buck would commit future acts of violence.
- Buck's defense counsel called Dr. Walter Quijano, a psychologist, as an expert witness on the issue of future dangerousness.
- Dr. Quijano's expert report, which was admitted into evidence, listed seven statistical factors for predicting future violence; under the heading "Race," it stated: "Black: Increased probability."
- During his testimony, Dr. Quijano affirmed on both direct and cross-examination that Buck's race increased the probability of his future dangerousness.
Procedural Posture:
- A Texas state jury convicted Duane Buck of capital murder and sentenced him to death.
- Buck's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
- Buck filed his first state habeas petition, which did not raise the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related to the expert's racial testimony; the petition was denied.
- Buck later filed a successive state habeas petition raising the ineffective assistance claim, which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed as an abuse of the writ.
- Buck filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
- The District Court denied the petition, holding that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was procedurally defaulted because it was not properly raised in his initial state habeas proceeding.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Buck a certificate of appealability (COA).
- Following the Supreme Court's decisions in Martinez v. Ryan and Trevino v. Thaler, Buck filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to reopen the District Court's judgment.
- The District Court denied the Rule 60(b)(6) motion, finding that Buck had not shown extraordinary circumstances.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Buck's application for a COA to appeal the denial of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Fifth Circuit's denial of the COA.
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Issue:
Do the extraordinary circumstances of a capital case, where defense counsel introduced expert testimony that the defendant's race made him more likely to be dangerous, justify reopening a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to hear an otherwise procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claim?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Roberts
Yes. The introduction of race as a factor in a capital sentencing proceeding by the defendant's own counsel presents an extraordinary circumstance that justifies reopening the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). Buck's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is meritorious under Strickland v. Washington. Counsel's performance was deficient because no competent attorney would introduce evidence that their client's race makes him more deserving of execution. This error was also prejudicial because the expert testimony, which appealed to a powerful racial stereotype, was directly relevant to the central question of future dangerousness at sentencing. The impact of such testimony cannot be considered 'de minimis' because it poisons public confidence in the judicial process and constitutes a disturbing departure from the principle that individuals are punished for what they do, not who they are. The extraordinary nature of the case is further confirmed by the State of Texas's own prior admission of error and consent to resentencing in nearly identical cases involving the same expert.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
No. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Buck failed to show the extraordinary circumstances required for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The evidence of Buck's future dangerousness, based on the heinous nature of his crime and his complete lack of remorse, was overwhelming, rendering Dr. Quijano's 'de minimis' racial testimony non-prejudicial under Strickland. The majority improperly disregards the deference owed to the lower court's fact-bound, equitable conclusion and minimizes the critical fact that it was Buck's own counsel, not the state, who elicited the testimony. The state's strong interest in the finality of judgments, especially after nearly eight years, should prevail, and the Court misapplies settled law to reach a desired outcome in a highly unusual case.
Analysis:
This decision significantly underscores the Court's intolerance for the injection of race into capital sentencing proceedings, treating such an error as a fundamental breakdown of the judicial process. It establishes that an egregious ineffective assistance of counsel claim involving racial prejudice can constitute an 'extraordinary circumstance' under Rule 60(b)(6), creating a pathway to overcome procedural finality that is otherwise very difficult to traverse. The ruling signals that the need to maintain public confidence in a colorblind justice system can outweigh even strong interests in finality, particularly in death penalty cases. This precedent will likely be invoked in future cases where petitioners argue that a fundamental constitutional error, especially one touching on race, warrants reopening a long-settled judgment.
