Buchanan v. Nye
275 P.2d 767, 1954 Cal. App. LEXIS 1509, 128 Cal. App. 2d 582 (1954)
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Rule of Law:
Inadmissible hearsay evidence cannot be introduced by framing it as a question during cross-examination, and a party's subsequent acquiescence to the admission of different hearsay does not waive a prior, valid objection to the erroneously admitted evidence.
Facts:
- Jean Buchanan was driving a pickup truck in a southerly direction, accompanied by her son Robert Buchanan and stepfather-in-law Thomas Middleton.
- A Buick sedan owned by Enid Nye and driven by Everett Murray Todd was traveling in the opposite, northerly direction.
- The two vehicles were involved in a serious collision, resulting in injuries to the appellants and the death of Todd.
- Buchanan testified that Nye's vehicle crossed the center line and drove directly into her path.
- Nye testified that she had no memory of the accident.
- A man named Sosic was an eyewitness to the accident but did not appear to testify at trial.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiffs (Jean Buchanan, Robert Buchanan, and Thomas Middleton) filed lawsuits against the defendant (Enid Nye) in a California trial court.
- The cases were consolidated, and a jury trial resulted in a verdict for the defendant, Nye.
- The plaintiffs, as appellants, appealed the judgment to the California District Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does reading an inadmissible hearsay statement from a police report into the record, framed as a question to an opposing attorney during cross-examination, constitute prejudicial error that is not waived by later consenting to the admission of different hearsay?
Opinions:
Majority - Mosk, J. pro tem.
Yes. Reading an inadmissible hearsay statement from a police report into evidence, under the guise of cross-examining an opposing attorney, constitutes prejudicial error. The essence of the hearsay rule is the right to cross-examine a declarant, which is impossible when the witness is absent. Counsel cannot achieve by indirection—embedding the statement in a question—that which is directly forbidden by the rules of evidence. While cross-examination is afforded wide latitude, it cannot be used as a vehicle to bring incompetent evidence before the jury. Furthermore, the appellant's later decision to withdraw an objection to separate hearsay evidence (the coroner's inquest testimony) did not waive the initial, proper objection to the police report statement. Acquiescence to a second error does not cure the first. The error was prejudicial because the respondent offered no eyewitness testimony and it is highly probable the jury gave significant weight to the improperly admitted statement.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the integrity of the hearsay rule by preventing its circumvention through clever trial tactics. It establishes that the scope of cross-examination, while broad, does not permit counsel to introduce inadmissible evidence by embedding it within a question. The case also clarifies the doctrine of waiver, holding that a party's failure to object to a second instance of improper evidence does not retroactively waive a proper objection to an earlier, distinct error. This precedent protects a litigant's right to appeal an erroneous ruling, even if they later make strategic choices to mitigate the damage caused by that error.
