Bruton v. United States
391 U.S. 123 (1968)
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Rule of Law:
The admission of a non-testifying co-defendant's confession that expressly implicates another defendant at their joint trial violates the latter's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and this violation cannot be cured by a limiting instruction to the jury.
Facts:
- George William Bruton and his co-defendant, Evans, were charged with armed postal robbery.
- While Evans was held in custody on state charges, a postal inspector interrogated him at the city jail.
- During the interrogation, Evans orally confessed to the postal inspector.
- In his confession, Evans stated that he and Bruton had committed the armed robbery together.
Procedural Posture:
- Bruton and Evans were tried jointly and convicted by a jury in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri for armed postal robbery.
- During the trial, a postal inspector testified that Evans had orally confessed and implicated Bruton.
- The trial judge instructed the jury that Evans' confession was admissible only against Evans and must be disregarded in determining Bruton's guilt.
- Both defendants appealed their convictions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals set aside Evans’ conviction, holding his confession was inadmissible against him.
- However, the Court of Appeals affirmed Bruton’s conviction, reasoning that the trial court's limiting instruction was sufficient to protect his rights.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider the precedent set in Delli Paoli v. United States.
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Issue:
Does the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant's confession that implicates another defendant at their joint trial violate the latter's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, even if the trial court instructs the jury to disregard the confession when determining the non-confessing defendant's guilt or innocence?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Brennan
Yes, the admission of such a confession violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The Court holds that because of the substantial risk that a jury, despite instructions to the contrary, will look to the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a co-defendant in determining a defendant's guilt, such a practice is unconstitutional. The basic premise of the prior rule in Delli Paoli v. United States—that it is 'reasonably possible for the jury to follow' limiting instructions—is a 'naive assumption' and an 'unmitigated fiction.' The Court found that the introduction of the confession added substantial weight to the government's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, as Evans did not take the stand, thereby denying Bruton his constitutional right of confrontation. This risk is so great and the consequences so vital that the practical limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice White
No, the admission of a co-defendant's confession with a proper limiting instruction does not violate the Confrontation Clause. The majority's ruling is an 'excessively rigid rule' that unnecessarily burdens the criminal justice system by limiting the use of joint trials, which conserve resources and prevent inconsistent verdicts. Unlike a defendant's own coerced confession, which is excluded for policy reasons regardless of its truthfulness, a co-defendant's confession is simply unreliable hearsay. A jury can be trusted to understand the inherent untrustworthiness of an accomplice's statement and follow a judge's clear instruction to disregard it as to the other defendant. There is no new evidence to suggest juries are less reliable than when the Court decided Delli Paoli.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Stewart
Yes, the admission of the confession violates the defendant's rights. The underlying rationale of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause precludes reliance upon cautionary instructions for certain kinds of hearsay that are at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult to discount. A jury cannot be trusted to give such evidence the minimal weight it deserves, regardless of instructions. Therefore, even apart from the precedent of Jackson v. Denno, the prior rule in Delli Paoli must be overruled on fundamental Sixth Amendment grounds.
Analysis:
This case establishes the landmark 'Bruton rule,' which provides significant protection for defendants in joint criminal trials. The decision effectively overrules Delli Paoli v. United States, rejecting the long-held legal fiction that juries can and will follow limiting instructions in the face of powerfully incriminating evidence. The ruling forces prosecutors to make a choice: 1) sever the trials of co-defendants, 2) forgo the use of the confession entirely, or 3) redact the confession to eliminate all references to the non-confessing co-defendant. This fundamentally alters trial strategy and enhances the practical application of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.
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