Brueckner v. Norwich University
169 Vt. 118, 730 A.2d 1086 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
To hold a corporate defendant liable for punitive damages, the plaintiff must prove the defendant acted with actual malice, which requires a showing of bad motive or a 'bad spirit and wrong intention,' not merely inaction, inattention, or indifference that constitutes negligence.
Facts:
- In August 1990, William C. Brueckner, Jr., a 24-year-old Navy veteran, enrolled as a freshman ('rook') at Norwich University, a military college, on a full ROTC scholarship.
- Norwich University appointed and trained upperclassmen, known as the 'cadre,' to indoctrinate and orient incoming rooks like Brueckner.
- Over a 16-day period, cadre members subjected Brueckner to numerous hazing incidents, including verbal harassment, preventing him from eating, destroying his academic work with water, and forcing him to do unauthorized calisthenics despite an injured shoulder.
- On one occasion, a cadre member on a skateboard slammed into Brueckner in a dormitory hallway.
- On another occasion, a cadre member struck Brueckner hard twice on his injured shoulder, which was in a sling, after Brueckner forgot to wear his name tag.
- Brueckner reported the hazing to Norwich officials but, believing the situation would not improve, he withdrew from the university.
- As a result of his withdrawal, Brueckner's $80,000 ROTC scholarship was terminated.
- In the years prior to Brueckner's enrollment, Norwich's senior leadership was aware of numerous and serious hazing incidents perpetrated by the cadre but had not implemented significant changes to training or supervision.
Procedural Posture:
- William C. Brueckner, Jr. sued Norwich University in a Vermont trial court for claims including assault and battery, emotional distress, and negligent supervision.
- A jury returned a verdict for Brueckner, finding Norwich liable on all counts.
- The jury awarded Brueckner compensatory damages totaling $488,600 and punitive damages of $1.75 million.
- Norwich University filed post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
- The trial court denied Norwich University's post-trial motions.
- Norwich University (appellant) appealed the denial of its motions to the Vermont Supreme Court, with Brueckner as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a university's 'inaction and inattention' regarding known, persistent hazing activities by student leaders, which demonstrates indifference to the health and safety of students, rise to the level of malice required to support an award of punitive damages under Vermont law?
Opinions:
Majority - Amestoy, C.J.
No. A university's inaction and inattention regarding hazing, even if it amounts to indifference to student safety, does not constitute the actual malice required to sustain an award of punitive damages. The court affirmed Norwich's liability for compensatory damages under theories of vicarious liability and negligent supervision, finding the cadre acted within the scope of their employment and that Norwich owed a direct duty of care to Brueckner. However, it reversed the punitive damages award, reasoning that Vermont law requires proof of 'actual malice,' defined as a 'bad spirit and wrong intention.' The court concluded that Norwich's conduct, characterized as a 'conscious choice to remain ignorant' and 'indifference to the health and safety of the rooks,' while negligent and wrongful, did not demonstrate the requisite bad motive. The court distinguished this from 'truly reprehensible conduct' frequently associated with crime, holding that inaction or inattention, without more, is insufficient to establish malice for punitive damages.
Dissenting - Johnson, J.
Yes. A university's conscious choice to remain ignorant of dangerous hazing activities demonstrates a reckless disregard for student rights, which is sufficient to constitute malice and support a punitive damages award. The dissent argues that the majority improperly narrows the definition of malice to require only 'bad motive' or personal ill will. It contends that established Vermont precedent allows malice to be proven through a second, alternative prong: conduct showing a 'reckless or wanton disregard of one's rights.' Norwich's awareness of a persistent hazing problem, coupled with its failure to alter the cadre's 'virtually unsupervised control' over rooks, provided sufficient evidence for a jury to find such reckless disregard. By overturning the jury's verdict, the majority invades the province of the jury and creates a standard that unfairly insulates institutions from punitive damages for policies that show a flagrant disregard for the safety of others.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the standard for punitive damages in Vermont, particularly for institutional defendants, by raising the threshold for what constitutes 'malice.' By rejecting 'inaction' and 'indifference' as sufficient grounds and instead requiring proof of a subjective 'bad motive,' the court makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to recover punitive damages in cases based on negligent supervision or systemic failures. The ruling protects corporations from punitive awards for failures of oversight unless a plaintiff can demonstrate a more active, culpable intent. This contrasts with the dissent's view and other jurisdictions where 'reckless disregard' for safety is often sufficient to warrant punitive damages.
