Bruce v. K.K.B., Inc.
52 S.W.3d 250, 2001 WL 637401 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
In Texas dram shop liability cases, circumstantial evidence and expert testimony regarding an individual's blood alcohol content and likely visible signs of intoxication can constitute 'more than a scintilla of evidence' to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the individual was 'obviously intoxicated' to the provider, thus precluding summary judgment.
Facts:
- On the afternoon of October 4, 1996, Margie Jean Diosdado and Christine Villarreal drank wine at an establishment known as the Quarterdeck.
- Diosdado and Villarreal then went to K.K.B. Inc., d/b/a Seafood & Spaghetti Works (Spaghetti Works), where they ordered and consumed approximately one and a third bottles of wine together.
- Spaghetti Works employees, including bartender Lara Carney and waiter Jason Livengood, observed Diosdado and Villarreal while serving them but stated in depositions that they did not observe any signs that either woman was intoxicated.
- After leaving Spaghetti Works around 6:15 p.m., Villarreal was unable to find her car keys, attempted to start her car with coins, and then passed out, later being driven home by an employee of Spaghetti Works.
- Around 6:35 p.m. on the same day, Diosdado lost control of her vehicle on a highway and collided with vehicles driven by Richard Bruce and Michael Vargas.
- Diosdado was killed in the accident, and a police report indicated her blood alcohol level was .48 g/dL, though an expert later opined her vitreous humor level indicated a .228 g/dL BAC.
- Appellants' expert, Dr. James C. Garriot, opined that with a .228 g/dL BAC, Diosdado would have been in a state of 'confusion' or 'excitement' while at Spaghetti Works, and her intoxication would have been 'obvious to an ordinary observer' during that time.
Procedural Posture:
- Richard Bruce and Michael Vargas (Appellants) brought a dram shop liability suit against K.K.B. Inc., d/b/a Seafood & Spaghetti Works (Spaghetti Works), the Quarterdeck, and the personal representative of Diosdado’s estate, in a Texas trial court.
- Spaghetti Works filed both a no-evidence motion for summary judgment and a traditional motion for summary judgment, arguing lack of evidence that Diosdado was apparently obviously intoxicated to its employees.
- Bruce and Vargas responded to the motions with evidence including a police report from the accident, depositions of Spaghetti Works employees and Christine Villarreal, and an expert report by Dr. James C. Garriot.
- The trial court granted Spaghetti Works' motion for summary judgment without specifying the ground or grounds relied on for the ruling.
- The trial court subsequently entered an order severing Spaghetti Works from the remaining defendants, making the summary judgment against Bruce and Vargas final.
- Bruce and Vargas appealed the summary judgment ruling to the Court of Appeals of Texas.
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Issue:
Does circumstantial evidence, including expert testimony on blood alcohol content and likely visible signs of intoxication, combined with evidence of the patron's and a companion's subsequent impairment, constitute 'more than a scintilla of evidence' to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether a dram shop provider should have apparent knowledge of a patron's obvious intoxication to the extent they presented a clear danger to themselves and others, thereby precluding summary judgment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rodriguez
Yes, circumstantial evidence, including expert testimony on blood alcohol content and likely visible signs of intoxication, combined with evidence of the patron's and a companion's subsequent impairment, can constitute 'more than a scintilla of evidence' to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether a dram shop provider should have had apparent knowledge of a patron's obvious intoxication to the extent they presented a clear danger to themselves and others, thereby precluding summary judgment. The court reversed the trial court's summary judgment, finding that Richard Bruce and Michael Vargas presented more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a fact issue regarding whether Diosdado's intoxication was 'apparent to the provider' as required by Section 2.02(b)(1) of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code. The court noted that a no-evidence summary judgment is improper if the respondent brings forth more than a scintilla of probative evidence. While Spaghetti Works employees testified they observed no signs of intoxication, the court emphasized that circumstantial evidence can prove a disputed fact. The evidence included Diosdado and Villarreal consuming several bottles of wine, Villarreal's subsequent inability to start her car and passing out, Diosdado's fatal accident shortly after leaving, and expert testimony from Dr. Garriot. Dr. Garriot's report opined that Diosdado's blood alcohol content would have caused obvious manifestations of intoxication during the time she was at Spaghetti Works, which would have been 'obvious to an ordinary observer.' The court rejected the notion that the provider must actually witness the intoxicated behavior for it to be 'apparent,' stating it must merely be 'visible, evident, and easily observed.' The court also found probative evidence from which a jury could infer Diosdado was a danger to herself and others, given the shared consumption with Villarreal and her subsequent state.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying the type and quantity of evidence required to defeat a no-evidence summary judgment motion in Texas dram shop liability cases. It establishes that direct testimony of observed intoxication is not strictly necessary; circumstantial evidence, particularly expert testimony correlating blood alcohol content with likely observable behaviors, along with evidence of subsequent events, can be sufficient. The decision prevents dram shops from escaping liability by simply claiming their employees 'didn't see' signs of intoxication, reinforcing that 'apparent' intoxication means 'visible, evident, and easily observed,' not necessarily actually observed. This lowers the bar for plaintiffs attempting to survive summary judgment in such cases.
