Browning v. Sacrison
518 P.2d 656 (1974)
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Rule of Law:
When a will devises a remainder interest with ambiguous survivorship language following a life estate, the modern constructional preference is to require the remainderman to survive the life tenant, not merely the testator, particularly when this interpretation aligns with the testator's specific intent as expressed elsewhere in the will.
Facts:
- In 1943, Kate Webb executed a will.
- Paragraph III of the will gave her daughter, Ada Sacrison, a life estate in a 960-acre farm.
- The will stated that upon Ada's death, the farm would go to her grandsons, Franklin Browning and Robert Sacrison, 'share and share alike, or, if either of them be dead, then all to the other.'
- The will explicitly and repeatedly stated that the grandsons' father, Clyde Browning, was to receive no benefit from the estate.
- Kate Webb died in 1954, survived by her daughter Ada and grandsons Franklin and Robert.
- Franklin Browning died in 1972 without any children.
- The life tenant, Ada Sacrison, was still alive at the time of Franklin Browning's death.
Procedural Posture:
- The widow of Franklin Browning, the plaintiff, filed a suit in an Oregon trial court seeking a construction of Kate Webb's will.
- The trial court found that the remainder interest was contingent upon the grandsons surviving the life tenant, Ada Sacrison.
- The plaintiff appealed the trial court's judgment to the Supreme Court of Oregon.
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Issue:
Does a remainder interest devised to two individuals 'or, if either of them be dead, then all to the other' following a life estate create a vested remainder at the testator's death or a contingent remainder requiring survival of the life tenant?
Opinions:
Majority - O’Connell, C. J.
No. The language creates a remainder contingent on surviving the life tenant. While the law has historically favored the early vesting of estates, this preference has weakened and must be weighed against other factors, chiefly the testator's intent. The modern view presumes that when a devise is made to a life tenant with a remainder conditioned on survivorship, the testator's intent is that the remainderman must survive the life tenant. The most compelling evidence of Kate Webb's intent was the specific provision disinheriting the grandsons' father, Clyde Browning. If the remainder vested at Webb's death, Franklin's interest could have passed through his intestate estate to his father, Clyde, which would directly contravene the testator's explicit wishes. Therefore, construing the remainder as contingent upon surviving the life tenant, Ada, best effectuates the testator's clearly expressed intent.
Analysis:
This decision signifies a notable shift from the rigid, historical constructional preference for early vesting of estates toward a more flexible approach centered on ascertaining the testator's probable intent. The court aligns with the modern trend that ambiguous survivorship language following a life estate implies a requirement to survive the life tenant. This ruling establishes that specific evidence of a testator's intent within the four corners of the will, such as a disinheritance clause, can override general rules of construction. Future Oregon cases interpreting ambiguous wills will likely prioritize a holistic analysis of the testator's intent over the mechanical application of archaic legal presumptions.
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