Browne v. Robb
1990 Del. LEXIS 360, 583 A.2d 949 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
Court-appointed contract attorneys in Delaware are entitled to qualified immunity from legal malpractice claims under the State Tort Claims Act, and their indigent clients lack standing as third-party beneficiaries to sue on the contract between the attorney and the State, while all fraud claims against such attorneys must meet strict particularity pleading requirements.
Facts:
- Cecil Browne was accused of a crime and, being indigent, had James A. Robb appointed to represent him pursuant to Delaware statute 29 Del.C. § 4605.
- The terms of James A. Robb's appointment were established in a contract between Robb and the Superior Court.
- Browne was ultimately convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
- Browne alleged that Robb's performance as his attorney was defective, including failures to properly exercise legal skills, locate witnesses, investigate victims for impeachment, secure evidence, and file requisite motions.
- Browne claimed Robb committed common law fraud by representing himself as an experienced and competent criminal defense attorney and promising skillful and diligent representation.
Procedural Posture:
- Cecil Browne filed a civil suit against his former counsel, James A. Robb, in the Delaware Superior Court, alleging legal malpractice, breach of contract, and common law fraud.
- James A. Robb moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6).
- The Superior Court granted Robb's motion to dismiss all of Browne's claims.
- Browne appealed the Superior Court's dismissal to the Supreme Court of Delaware.
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Issue:
Does a court-appointed contract attorney in Delaware enjoy qualified immunity from legal malpractice claims, does an indigent client have standing to sue that attorney for breach of contract with the court, and must claims of common law fraud against the attorney meet specific pleading requirements?
Opinions:
Majority - MOORE, Justice
Yes, a court-appointed contract attorney in Delaware enjoys qualified immunity from legal malpractice claims; no, an indigent client does not have standing to sue that attorney for breach of contract with the court; and yes, claims of common law fraud against the attorney must meet specific pleading requirements. Regarding legal malpractice, the Court affirmed that court-appointed contract lawyers, like public defenders, are 'public officers or employees' under the State Tort Claims Act (10 Del.C. § 4001) and thus enjoy qualified immunity. This immunity is justified by public policy reasons, including the need for counsel to litigate fearlessly, the duty to accept any client, and the public interest in avoiding duplicative litigation, particularly given the unique attorney-client relationship where appointed counsel cannot reject clients. Browne's complaint was dismissed because its allegations were conclusory and failed to plead specific facts to overcome the statutory presumption of immunity, which requires proving the absence of good faith, discretion, or the presence of gross or wanton negligence, in violation of Superior Court Civil Rule 9(b). Regarding the breach of contract claim, the Court found that Browne lacked standing to enforce the contract between Robb and the Superior Court. While the State has a statutory duty to provide indigent defendants with counsel, Browne was merely an 'incidental beneficiary' to the contract, not an intended 'creditor beneficiary.' The Court noted that allowing Browne to sue indirectly on the contract would circumvent the established qualified immunity for malpractice claims and the pleading standards required to overcome it, given the special relationship where appointed counsel cannot bargain or reject clients. Regarding the common law fraud claim, the Court agreed with the trial court that Browne's complaint failed to state a claim with sufficient particularity as required by Superior Court Civil Rule 9(b). Browne's allegations, such as Robb misrepresenting his skills and competence, were conclusory and lacked specific facts regarding the time, place, and contents of the alleged false representations. Furthermore, the Court noted that subjective judgments about one's legal abilities are generally considered mere expressions of opinion and not actionable statements of fact for fraud.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the protections afforded to court-appointed attorneys, aligning their immunity status with that of public defenders and reinforcing strict pleading standards for claims against them. It prevents indigent clients from suing their appointed counsel for malpractice without a highly specific factual basis demonstrating bad faith or gross negligence, and it closes a potential avenue for litigation by denying third-party beneficiary standing for contract claims. The ruling helps ensure that attorneys are willing to take on court appointments without fear of excessive litigation, albeit at the cost of limiting clients' recourse for alleged deficiencies in representation, unless clear and specific evidence of extreme misconduct can be presented.
