No, what the reporter did was not okay, and the company can sue him for it. Accusing a company of something so immoral, like trying to get kids to smoke, is so damaging that it's automatically considered libel. The reporter isn't protected just because he was reporting on a government document, because he didn't give a 'fair summary.' He made the story sound much worse by taking things out of context and making it seem like the company was doing these things right now.

Yes, Jacobson's TV story told lies about Brown & Williamson that were so bad the company can sue, even without proving the lies cost them money. Saying a cigarette company is trying to get kids to smoke by making it seem cool is a really bad lie that would seriously hurt the company's reputation. Jacobson made the old ad company's ideas sound like Brown & Williamson's current strategy, which was worse than what the government report actually said. So he can't use the excuse that he was just fairly summarizing the report. The appeals court said the law treats companies the same as people when it comes to being lied about in a way that really hurts their reputation. The lower court was wrong to dismiss the lawsuit, so Brown & Williamson gets another chance to make their case.

If the purpose of the public figure-private person dichotomy is to protect the privacy of individuals who do not seek publicity or engage in activities that place them in the public eye, there seems no reason to classify a large corporation as a private person

The district court recognized that this was a case of libel per se and that therefore Brown & Williamson was entitled to presumed damages.

Illinois law is in disarray on the question whether actual malice defeats the privilege of fair summary

A corporation... can have a reputation for adhering to the moral standards of the community in which it sells its products and if that reputation is assailed in a fashion likely to harm the corporation seriously, the corporation has been libeled under Illinois law.

Such general allegations, which make no effort to explain how any reputational damage translated into actual harm, are not enough.

Although Greenridge is a corporation, not an individual, the Seventh Circuit has rejected the proposition that "the standards for proof of defamation are different for corporations than for other plaintiffs," and instead has explained that "[Illinois] cases treat corporate plaintiffs just like individuals."

—cases arising from statements that "are so obviously and naturally hurtful to the person aggrieved that proof of their injurious character can be, and is, dispensed with

Consistent with the Restatement, when the article carries a greater "sting" than the original proceeding, then the fair report privilege has been abused and thus forfeited.

And even a statement that falls within one of those categories is not necessarily slander per se anymore

In summarizing the relevant part of the broadcast, the Seventh Circuit found that it conveyed the following message: Brown & Williamson currently is advertising cigarettes in a manner designed to entice children to smoke by associating smoking with drinking, sex, marijuana, and other illicit pleasures of youth.

Yes, such a broadcast can constitute libel per se, and no, it is not necessarily protected by the privilege of fair summary. A statement that prejudices a corporation in its trade by accusing it of an immoral business strategy, such as targeting children for cigarette sales, is so obviously and naturally hurtful that it constitutes libel per se under Illinois law, dispensing with the need to prove specific financial damages. Furthermore, the privilege to report on government proceedings is lost if the summary is unfair. A jury could reasonably find that Jacobson's broadcast was an unfair summary because it amplified the 'sting' of the FTC report by implying the advertising strategy was current, directly attributing quotes from an outside agency's report to the plaintiff, and using more inflammatory language (i.e., 'children' instead of 'young smokers').

Yes, the broadcast is libelous per se. The broadcast's implications that Brown & Williamson was targeting children with its cigarette advertising were sufficiently defamatory to justify an award of damages without proof of actual damage, because accusing a corporation of enticing children to smoke is likely to cause it serious harm. The broadcast carried a 'greater sting' than the FTC staff report it claimed to summarize, because it implied the Kennan proposals were current Brown & Williamson strategy rather than a 6-year-old rejected proposal. Therefore, the fair summary privilege was forfeited due to the discrepancies between the broadcast and the FTC report. The court also clarified that the standards for proof of defamation are not different for corporations than for other plaintiffs under Illinois law. A corporation can have a reputation for adhering to the moral standards of the community and be defamed by accusations of unethical conduct. The dismissal of the defamation count is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson

Case Podcast

Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

Why This Case Matters

Gunnerbot