Brown v. USA Taekwondo
S259216 (2021)
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Rule of Law:
In California, a legal duty to protect a plaintiff from harm caused by a third party arises only when there exists a special relationship between the parties or other circumstances giving rise to an affirmative duty; the Rowland factors are then applied to determine whether policy considerations counsel limiting that established duty, not to create an independent duty.
Facts:
- As teenagers, Yazmin Brown, Kendra Gatt, and Brianna Bordon trained in the Olympic sport of taekwondo.
- Their coach, Marc Gitelman, sexually abused them for years while they traveled to compete at various taekwondo events.
- USA Taekwondo (USAT) sponsored these competitions and registered Gitelman as a coach.
- The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) is a federally chartered nonprofit corporation that certifies and oversees national governing bodies like USAT.
- The sexual abuse of young athletes was a known problem, prompting USOC to mandate that national governing bodies adopt a Safe Sport Program.
- USAT failed to implement its Safe Sport Program in a timely fashion, a fact known to USOC, which placed USAT on probation as a result.
- USAT temporarily suspended Gitelman but permitted him to continue coaching at USAT competitions for several months before ultimately placing him on its list of banned coaches.
- Gitelman was ultimately convicted of multiple felonies for the sexual abuse of the minor athletes he trained.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs (Yazmin Brown, Kendra Gatt, and Brianna Bordon) filed a civil suit in Los Angeles County Superior Court against Marc Gitelman, USA Taekwondo (USAT), the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), and several others.
- USOC and USAT filed demurrers to the complaint, arguing that Brown had not adequately alleged they had an affirmative duty to protect the plaintiffs from Gitelman’s abuse.
- The trial court sustained both demurrers without leave to amend and entered judgments of dismissal in favor of USAT and USOC.
- Brown appealed the judgments of dismissal to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven.
- The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment dismissing USAT, finding Brown had adequately alleged USAT owed a duty to protect, but affirmed the judgment dismissing USOC, concluding USOC had no special relationship with either the plaintiffs or Gitelman.
- The Supreme Court of California granted review to clarify the applicable framework for determining whether a defendant has a duty to protect a plaintiff from harm caused by a third party.
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Issue:
Does a defendant have a legal duty to protect a plaintiff from harm caused by a third party solely based on the Rowland factors, or must a special relationship or other circumstance giving rise to an affirmative duty first be established, with the Rowland factors then used to limit that duty?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kruger
No, a defendant does not have a legal duty to protect a plaintiff from harm caused by a third party solely based on the Rowland factors. The court clarified that establishing a duty to protect from third-party harm requires a two-step inquiry. First, there must be a special relationship between the defendant and the victim (giving the victim a right to expect protection) or the dangerous third party (entailing an ability to control the third party's conduct), or some other circumstances giving rise to an affirmative duty. The general rule is that one has no duty to act to protect others from third-party conduct unless the defendant created the risk of harm. The Rowland factors (foreseeability of harm, certainty of injury, closeness of connection, moral blame, policy of preventing future harm, burden on defendant, availability of insurance) are not a freestanding source of duty but rather serve to determine whether policy considerations 'limit' or 'excuse' a duty that has already been established by a special relationship or other affirmative duty. The court reasoned that this framework reflects a long-standing balance between individual freedom and the need to protect vulnerable parties in relationships involving dependence or control. The court disapproved of appellate decisions that treated Rowland as an independent source of duty, concluding that the Court of Appeal in this case employed the correct framework. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was affirmed.
Concurring - Justice Cuéllar
Concurred, clarifying how the majority's two-step framework for duty to protect aligns with California tort law's fundamental principles of allocating risks and costs to those who can better prevent them, and providing just compensation. Justice Cuéllar explained that California law generally presumes a duty of reasonable care, which is only limited by Rowland factors in specific categories of cases for clear public policy reasons. The 'special relationship' doctrine serves as a mechanism to establish a duty where a defendant might otherwise be considered a bystander, acknowledging that certain relationships (like those involving control or dependence) inherently carry policy-based duties. This 'special relationship' is merely a label for specific policy considerations, such as the defendant's ability to control the environment and the plaintiff's reasonable dependency. The two-step process helps courts focus on public policy at a general level for duty questions, while leaving case-specific issues of breach and causation to the jury, thus preserving the proper balance between judicial and jury functions. The concurrence noted that USOC, as an organizer, was hardly a bystander to the plaintiffs' harm, even if the general duty of care wasn't explicitly argued.
Analysis:
This landmark decision clarifies the often-confused relationship between the 'special relationship' doctrine and the Rowland factors in California negligence law, particularly concerning a defendant's duty to protect against third-party harm. By definitively establishing a two-step framework, the Supreme Court reinforces that Rowland factors are for limiting an existing duty, not creating one where no special relationship or other affirmative duty exists. This clarification provides a more predictable and consistent legal standard, which will likely reduce litigation over novel duty arguments and ensure that liability for third-party harm is grounded in established relationships of control or dependence.
