Brown v. Superior Court
208 Cal. Rptr. 724, 691 P.2d 272, 37 Cal. 3d 477 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
When a lawsuit includes both claims governed by the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and non-FEHA claims arising from the same facts, the special venue provisions of the FEHA control, allowing the entire action to be tried in a county permitted by the FEHA statute.
Facts:
- Andrew Brown, Charles Jones, and Sam George were employed by C.C. Myers, Inc. on a highway construction project in Alameda County.
- C.C. Myers, Inc. allegedly discriminated against Brown and Jones because they are Black, through actions such as the use of racial slurs, telling of racist jokes, and discriminatory work assignments.
- George, who is white and was a foreman on the project, was allegedly discharged because he refused to participate in his employer's discriminatory practices.
- C.C. Myers, Inc. ultimately discharged Brown and Jones as well.
Procedural Posture:
- Andrew Brown, Charles Jones, and Sam George (petitioners) filed a complaint against C.C. Myers, Inc. (defendants) in Alameda County Superior Court, a court of first instance.
- The initial complaint alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful discharge.
- Petitioners later filed an amended complaint to add a cause of action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) after receiving a right-to-sue notice from the state agency.
- Defendants moved for a change of venue to Sacramento County, the county where the individual and corporate defendants resided or had their principal places of business.
- The Alameda County Superior Court granted the defendants' motion and ordered the case transferred to Sacramento County.
- Petitioners sought a writ of mandate from the California Supreme Court to compel the superior court to vacate its transfer order.
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Issue:
Does the special venue provision of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) control over the general venue provision of the Code of Civil Procedure when a complaint alleges both FEHA and non-FEHA causes of action arising from the same set of facts?
Opinions:
Majority - Bird, C. J.
Yes. The special venue provision of the FEHA controls over the general venue provision when a complaint alleges both FEHA and non-FEHA causes of action arising from the same facts. The FEHA establishes a comprehensive scheme to combat employment discrimination, a fundamental public policy of the state. The Legislature provided a wide choice of venue to aggrieved persons to facilitate enforcement and remove financial barriers to litigation. Forcing a plaintiff to choose between abandoning non-FEHA claims, litigating in two different counties, or forfeiting their venue choice in favor of the defendant's county of residence would frustrate the legislative purpose and render the FEHA's special venue provision mere surplusage. Therefore, the strong public policy of the FEHA outweighs the general preference for trial in a defendant's county of residence, creating an exception to the traditional 'mixed action' rule.
Concurring - Mosk, J.
Yes, the FEHA venue provision controls in this case. Justice Mosk concurs but writes separately to express concern that this holding could be misapplied in the future. He cautions that if a plaintiff adds a redundant FEHA cause of action solely to defeat a defendant's pre-existing and proper motion for a change of venue, a trial court should retain discretion to grant the motion to transfer. However, in this case, the FEHA claim was added before the defendants moved to change venue, so there was no indication of such a purpose.
Concurring - Kaus, J.
Yes, the FEHA venue provision controls. Justice Kaus concurs, noting that the defendants failed to timely raise a potentially relevant argument regarding a clause in the FEHA venue statute. The defendants only raised the argument that they were not 'found within' Alameda County for the first time in their petition for hearing before the Supreme Court. Because the point was raised too late in the proceedings, it was not considered, and he therefore joins the majority opinion.
Analysis:
This decision carves out a significant public policy exception to the long-standing 'mixed action' venue rule, which typically favors the defendant's right to trial in their county of residence. The court prioritizes the legislative intent behind the FEHA, strengthening the statute's enforcement mechanism by protecting a plaintiff's broad choice of venue. This precedent ensures that victims of discrimination are not procedurally disadvantaged by pleading alternative common law tort or contract theories based on the same discriminatory acts. The ruling signals that specific venue statutes tied to important civil rights laws will likely prevail over general venue rules in mixed-action cases.
