Brown v. State
378 Md. 355, 2003 Md. LEXIS 758, 835 A.2d 1208 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
Police deception used to induce a person to merely open the door to a residence does not, by itself, vitiate a subsequent consent to enter and search, provided the police reveal their true identity before consent to enter is requested. The voluntariness of the consent is determined by the totality of the circumstances.
Facts:
- Maryland State Trooper George Wooden received an anonymous tip about possible drug activity in Room 109 at the Super Eight Motel in Aberdeen.
- At approximately 10:00 a.m. on January 31, 2001, Wooden and two other officers went to Room 109.
- Wooden knocked on the door and, when the appellant asked who was there, Wooden responded "maintenance" and said he needed to check the thermostat.
- The appellant opened the door.
- As soon as the door was open, Wooden displayed his police badge, identified himself as a police officer, and asked if he could come in and talk with the appellant.
- The appellant orally agreed to let Wooden in and backed away from the door to allow entry.
- Once inside, Wooden smelled marijuana and observed a burnt marijuana cigarette in an ashtray.
- After a brief interaction involving the cigarette, Wooden asked for permission to search the room, and the appellant consented, leading to the discovery of cocaine, a digital scale, and cash.
Procedural Posture:
- The appellant was charged in the Circuit Court for Harford County (the trial court) with possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
- The appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his motel room, arguing his consent to the search was involuntary.
- The trial court conducted a suppression hearing, found the police officer's testimony credible, and denied the motion to suppress, ruling there was express consent to enter and search.
- Following his conviction, the appellant appealed the denial of his suppression motion to the Court of Appeals of Maryland (the state's highest court).
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Issue:
Does a police officer's use of a ruse to induce a suspect to open their motel room door automatically invalidate the suspect's subsequent consent to enter and search, when that consent is given after the officer has revealed their true identity?
Opinions:
Majority - Wilner, J.
No, a police officer's use of a ruse to induce a suspect to open their door does not automatically invalidate a subsequent consent to enter and search. The validity of consent is determined by the totality of the circumstances, and the deception in this case was limited to inducing the opening of the door, not the consent to enter. The court reasoned that the deception ended once the door was open and Trooper Wooden identified himself as a police officer. The appellant's subsequent consent to enter was a separate act, not induced by the initial misrepresentation. Applying the 'totality of the circumstances' test from Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the court found the consent was voluntary because the appellant knew he was dealing with police when he agreed to let them in. The court distinguished this from cases where deception is used to obtain the entry itself, holding that the initial ruse did not have an 'erosive effect' on the subsequent, informed consent.
Dissenting - Bell, C.J.
Yes, the police officer's use of a ruse should invalidate the subsequent consent. The majority improperly parses a single, continuous event into two distinct parts. The deception to open the door is an inseparable part of the entire encounter that taints the voluntariness of everything that follows. The dissent argues that the surprise and confusion of realizing one has been duped by police undermines the ability to give voluntary consent, especially when incriminating evidence (the smell of marijuana) is immediately apparent upon opening the door. Allowing police to use deception without any reasonable suspicion to invade the privacy of a home gives officers too much discretion and invites abuse.
Concurring - Raker, J.
No. Although the author dissented in the prior case of Scott v. State, which authorized the 'knock and talk' police technique, the principle of stare decisis now controls. Because Scott is the controlling law in Maryland, the majority's application of that precedent to the facts of this case is legally correct. Therefore, despite personal disagreement with the underlying doctrine, the author concurs in the judgment of the court.
Analysis:
This decision refines the 'knock and talk' doctrine by clarifying the permissible scope of police deception. It establishes that a ruse is constitutionally acceptable if its effect is limited to causing the door to be opened, and a separate, informed consent is obtained for the actual entry. This creates a critical distinction between deception to gain access to the doorway versus deception to gain entry into the home. The ruling provides law enforcement with a specific tactical approval but also sets up a fine line that will likely be the subject of future litigation, focusing on how attenuated the initial deception is from the subsequent consent.
