Brown v. State
955 S.W.2d 276, 1997 WL 560907, 1997 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 61 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal defendant is entitled to a specific jury instruction on the issue of voluntary conduct if evidence is presented from any source that raises a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant's conduct was the product of his own volition, as the issue of voluntariness is separate from the issue of the defendant's mental state.
Facts:
- Alfred Brown had a prior altercation with James McLean, in which McLean and others had beaten Brown.
- A week later, on July 17, 1992, Brown obtained a .25 caliber handgun for protection against McLean and his associates, who were known to carry firearms.
- While in an apartment complex parking lot, Brown held the handgun in his left hand due to a debilitating injury to his dominant right hand.
- As Brown was raising the handgun, another person, Ryan Coleman, bumped him from behind.
- The handgun discharged when Coleman bumped Brown.
- The shot fatally wounded Joseph Caraballo, who was an acquaintance and associate of Brown.
Procedural Posture:
- Alfred Brown was charged by indictment with murder in the 268th Judicial District Court of Fort Bend County, a trial court of first instance.
- At trial, Brown requested a jury instruction on the issue of an involuntary act, which the trial court denied.
- A jury found Brown guilty of murder, and the trial court sentenced him to 12 years of imprisonment.
- Brown, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Fourteenth Court of Appeals of Texas, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, finding that the failure to give the requested instruction was reversible error.
- The State of Texas, as petitioner, was granted discretionary review by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the state's highest court for criminal cases.
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Issue:
Does a trial court commit reversible error by refusing to provide a separate jury instruction on the voluntariness of an act when the defendant presents evidence that the act was physically involuntary due to the conduct of a third party?
Opinions:
Majority - Overstreet, Judge
Yes. A defendant is entitled to a requested jury charge on the issue of the voluntariness of his acts whenever the evidence warrants it. The court reasoned that the issue of the voluntariness of one's physical bodily movements is a separate and distinct issue from one's mental state (mens rea). Citing established precedent, the court affirmed that a defendant is entitled to an affirmative defensive instruction on every issue raised by the evidence, regardless of whether it is strong, feeble, or contradicted. In this case, both Brown's and Coleman's testimony that Brown was bumped from behind, causing the gun to discharge, was sufficient evidence to raise the issue of voluntariness. The court distinguished this case from others like George v. State, where no outside force precipitated the discharge, specifically noting that 'precipitation by another individual' is precisely the kind of evidence that requires the instruction. Therefore, the trial court's refusal to give the requested charge was an error because the State's argument that voluntariness is subsumed within the 'intentionally and knowingly' elements of murder has been repeatedly rejected by the court.
Dissenting - Price, Judge
No. A defendant is not entitled to an affirmative defensive jury instruction on voluntariness because the requirement of a voluntary act is an implied element of every offense, not a defense. The dissent argued that the majority continues down an 'errant path' by conflating the modern requirement of a voluntary act under Penal Code § 6.01(a) with the defunct common law defense of 'accident'. The requirement of a voluntary act is not a defense located in Chapters 8 or 9 of the Penal Code but is a general principle of culpability. As an implied element of the offense, proof of the culpable mental state—that the defendant acted 'intentionally or knowingly'—will almost always encompass and satisfy the proof of a voluntary act. A defendant's claim of an involuntary act is therefore merely a negation of an element of the State's case, and it is well-settled that a defendant is not entitled to a special instruction that simply negates an element of the offense. Thus, the trial court properly denied the request.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the critical distinction in Texas criminal law between the physical act (actus reus) and the mental state (mens rea), treating them as independent elements for a jury's consideration. It establishes a very low evidentiary threshold for a defendant to secure a jury instruction on involuntary conduct, requiring only some evidence from any source, even just the defendant's uncorroborated testimony. By affirming that voluntariness is not subsumed by intent, the case reinforces the jury's role as the sole arbiter of fact on all raised defensive issues, preventing judges from withholding instructions based on their own assessment of the evidence's credibility.
