Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington
538 U.S. 216 (2003)
Rule of Law:
When the government takes private property, the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause requires payment measured by the owner's net pecuniary loss, not the government's gain. If the owner's net loss is zero because the property value would not have existed for the owner but for the government's program, the just compensation due is zero.
Facts:
- The Washington Supreme Court established a mandatory Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts (IOLTA) program.
- The program requires lawyers and Limited Practice Officers (LPOs) to deposit client funds that are too small in amount or held for too short a time to generate net interest for the client into a single, pooled, interest-bearing IOLTA account.
- The program's rules mandate that if funds are capable of generating net interest for a client, they must be deposited in a separate, interest-bearing account for that client's benefit.
- The net interest generated by the pooled IOLTA accounts is paid directly to the Legal Foundation of Washington (Foundation) to fund charitable legal services for the needy.
- Petitioner Allen Brown deposited over $90,000 with an LPO for a real estate closing; it remained in an IOLTA account for two days, generating approximately $4.96 in interest that was paid to the Foundation.
- Petitioner Greg Hayes deposited funds for a real estate transaction that were held in an IOLTA account for a short period before closing, with the interest also being paid to the Foundation.
- Without the IOLTA program's pooling mechanism, neither Brown's nor Hayes's funds would have produced any net interest for them because administrative costs and bank fees would have exceeded any interest earned.
Procedural Posture:
- Allen Brown and Greg Hayes filed suit against the justices of the Washington Supreme Court and the Legal Foundation of Washington in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington.
- The plaintiffs alleged the state's IOLTA rules violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
- The plaintiffs, as appellants, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court, finding a taking had occurred and remanding for a determination of just compensation.
- The Ninth Circuit then reheard the case en banc and affirmed the District Court’s original judgment in favor of the defendants (appellees).
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to the plaintiffs, Brown and Hayes.
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Issue:
Does a state's mandatory Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts (IOLTA) program, which directs interest from pooled client trust funds to a legal aid foundation, constitute a taking of private property that violates the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause when the funds could not have generated net interest for the client on their own?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
No. The Washington IOLTA program does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause because the just compensation due for the taking of interest is measured by the property owner's net pecuniary loss, which is zero in this case. The Court assumed that the transfer of interest to the Foundation constituted a 'per se' taking of private property. However, the Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property, but rather taking without just compensation. Citing precedent like Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, the Court affirmed that compensation is measured by what the owner has lost, not what the taker has gained. Under Washington's IOLTA rules, only funds that cannot generate net interest for the client are placed in IOLTA accounts. Therefore, the clients suffered no net monetary loss from the program, as they would not have received any interest income otherwise. Because the owners' pecuniary loss is zero, the just compensation required is also zero.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
Yes. The Washington IOLTA program violates the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause by taking private property without paying its fair market value. Once interest is earned on the petitioners' funds, that interest is their private property, as established in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation. The State's subsequent seizure of that interest is a taking that requires compensation equal to the fair market value of the property on the date it is appropriated, not some theoretical 'net loss' based on a hypothetical world without the IOLTA program. The majority's reasoning—that the State can take the property because the State's program created it—was explicitly rejected in Phillips and creates a dangerous 'Robin Hood Taking' precedent where the government can seize property it helps create without paying for it.
Dissenting - Justice Kennedy
Yes. While joining Justice Scalia's dissent in full, this opinion adds that the State's program not only constitutes an uncompensated taking but also creates a state-sponsored monopoly for the support of certain viewpoints. By mandating that the interest from these accounts serves causes preferred by the state, the program raises serious First Amendment concerns regarding compelled speech. The owners of the funds are forced to financially support specific organizations without any choice, a constitutional violation that may follow from the initial Fifth Amendment violation.
Analysis:
This decision provides significant constitutional protection to IOLTA programs nationwide, a critical funding source for indigent legal services. By distinguishing between the existence of a property right (affirmed in Phillips) and the valuation of just compensation, the Court established that a taking can occur for which zero compensation is due. The 'net loss' principle articulated here means that in situations where a government program creates economic value that an individual could not have otherwise realized, the government may appropriate that value without violating the Just Compensation Clause. The dissent forcefully argues this creates a dangerous exception to traditional takings jurisprudence, allowing the government to circumvent its constitutional obligations by redefining the compensation formula.
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