Brown v. Hartlage
456 U.S. 45, 71 L. Ed. 2d 732, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 92 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
A state violates the First Amendment's protection of political speech when it voids an election because the winning candidate promised during the campaign to serve at a salary lower than that fixed by law.
Facts:
- Carl Brown was a candidate challenging incumbent Earl Hartlage for the office of Jefferson County Commissioner.
- During the campaign, Brown held a televised press conference where he criticized Hartlage's salary as an 'outrageous level of remuneration.'
- At the press conference, Brown pledged that if elected, one of his first official acts would be to lower his own salary, saving taxpayers money.
- A few days later, after learning the pledge might violate Kentucky law, Brown and his running mate issued a joint statement formally retracting the promise.
- In the November 1979 general election, Brown defeated Hartlage by over 10,000 votes.
Procedural Posture:
- After losing the election, Earl Hartlage filed an action against Carl Brown in the Jefferson Circuit Court (a state trial court).
- Hartlage alleged Brown's promise violated the Kentucky Corrupt Practices Act and asked the court to declare the election void.
- The trial court found that Brown's promise did violate the Act but exercised its discretion and declined to order a new election.
- Hartlage, as appellant, appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals (an intermediate appellate court).
- The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the promise was an unconstitutional violation and that voiding the election was mandatory.
- The Supreme Court of Kentucky (the state's highest court) denied Brown's request for review.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Brown's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does the First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibit a state from declaring an election void because the victorious candidate announced to voters during his campaign that he intended to serve at a salary less than that 'fixed by law'?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
Yes. The First Amendment prohibits a state from declaring an election void because a candidate promised to serve at a lower salary. Such a promise is core political speech, essential to the unfettered interchange of ideas for bringing about political change, and it cannot be categorized as a corrupt practice like bribery. The court reasoned that unlike bribery, Brown's promise was not a private quid pro quo arrangement; it was a public pledge made to all voters, with the benefit intended for the public fisc. The benefit would accrue to all taxpayers, not just those who voted for him. The Court also rejected the state's interest in preventing factual misstatements (since Brown could not legally lower his salary), holding that erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate and the absolute liability imposed by the Kentucky law creates an unconstitutional chilling effect. The preferred First Amendment remedy for false or misleading campaign speech is 'more speech, not enforced silence.'
Concurring - Justice Rehnquist
Yes. Justice Rehnquist agreed with the judgment that the Kentucky law impermissibly limited freedom of speech but wrote separately because he was unable to join the majority's analogy between anti-corruption election laws and state defamation laws. He believed the case could be decided on the narrower grounds that the law excessively regulated the electoral process, as established in precedents like Mills v. Alabama. He suggested that on different facts, he would give more weight to a state's interest in preventing corruption in elections.
Analysis:
This decision firmly protects campaign promises related to fiscal policy as a form of core political speech under the First Amendment. It establishes a critical distinction between a candidate's public pledge to benefit the citizenry through official government action (like lowering a salary or taxes) and a private, corrupt bargain to buy votes. The ruling significantly limits a state's power to regulate the content of campaign speech, requiring a compelling interest and narrowly tailored means. It reinforces the principle that the remedy for questionable or even factually incorrect campaign speech is typically counter-speech by the opposition, trusting the electorate to make the final judgment.
