Brown v. General Services Administration et al.
425 U.S. 820 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment.
Facts:
- Clarence Brown, a Black employee at the General Services Administration (GSA) since 1957, had not been promoted since 1966.
- In December 1970, Brown and two white colleagues were rated 'highly qualified' for a promotion to grade GS-9; a white candidate was selected.
- Brown filed an internal administrative complaint alleging racial discrimination but withdrew it after being told other positions would soon be available.
- In June 1971, another GS-9 position became vacant, and Brown was again recommended as 'highly qualified' alongside two other candidates.
- A white applicant was again chosen for the promotion.
- Brown filed a second administrative complaint with the GSA's Equal Employment Opportunity Office.
- Following an investigation, a complaints examiner found no evidence of racial discrimination and determined Brown was not promoted because he was not 'fully cooperative.'
- The GSA issued its final agency decision, concluding that considerations of race had not entered into the promotional process.
Procedural Posture:
- Clarence Brown filed suit in a Federal District Court against the General Services Administration and others, alleging jurisdiction under multiple statutes, including Title VII (§ 717) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
- The government respondents moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing Brown failed to file his complaint within the 30-day period required by § 717(c).
- The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.
- Brown, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that § 717 is the exclusive judicial remedy for federal employment discrimination and that Brown's complaint was untimely.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does § 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, provide the exclusive judicial remedy for a federal employee's claims of employment discrimination?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stewart
Yes. Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides the exclusive, pre-emptive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment. The Court's reasoning is based on both legislative history and statutory structure. Congress, when enacting the 1972 amendments, believed that federal employees had no effective judicial remedies for discrimination due to barriers like sovereign immunity, and intended to create a new, comprehensive scheme. The structure of § 717, with its careful blend of administrative and judicial processes, including rigorous exhaustion requirements and strict time limits, is inconsistent with the idea that it merely supplements other remedies. Allowing federal employees to bypass this detailed scheme by suing under more general statutes would render it superfluous. This case is distinguishable from Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, which found remedies for private employees to be non-exclusive, because the legislative history for the 1972 federal employee amendments shows a contrary intent, and sovereign immunity is a central issue for federal employment. The Court has consistently held that a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies, and § 717 is such a statute.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
No. The remedy provided by § 717 of the Civil Rights Act should not be considered exclusive. The primary goal of the 1972 amendments was to grant federal employees the same full rights available to private sector employees, who are not limited to Title VII and can pursue remedies under other statutes like 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The reasoning of Johnson v. Railway Express Agency and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., which established parallel and overlapping remedies for private employees, should apply with equal force here. The majority's reliance on Congress's mistaken belief that no other remedies existed undermines, rather than supports, its conclusion; Congress cannot intend to repeal laws it does not believe are applicable. Furthermore, a House subcommittee explicitly rejected an amendment that would have made § 717 the exclusive remedy, indicating a clear legislative intent against exclusivity. The heavy burden of persuading the Court to read an exclusivity provision into a statute where none is written has not been met.
Analysis:
This decision bifurcates the legal pathways for employment discrimination claims between federal and private sector employees. It establishes that federal employees must strictly adhere to the administrative exhaustion requirements and filing deadlines of Title VII, effectively closing the door to claims brought under other civil rights statutes like § 1981. The ruling underscores a key principle of statutory preemption: a specific and comprehensive remedial scheme will generally displace older, more general ones. For future litigants, this holding serves as a critical warning that federal employees alleging discrimination have only one avenue for judicial relief, and failure to comply precisely with its procedural requirements will result in dismissal.
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