Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Buildings
2013 WL 1363711, 113 So. 3d 175, 2013 La. LEXIS 594 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
Whether a defective condition creates an unreasonable risk of harm is a question of fact for the jury, and a hazard is only considered 'open and obvious' so as to negate a breach of duty if it is apparent to all who encounter it, not just the injured plaintiff. A plaintiff's awareness of a known risk is properly considered under comparative fault principles, rather than as a complete bar to recovery.
Facts:
- The State of Louisiana owned the Wooddale Tower, an office building where elevators frequently malfunctioned, stopping unevenly with the building floors.
- This malfunctioning was caused by dust and debris from a roofing project in 1998.
- Between 1999 and 2000, the State received multiple complaints from tenants about the elevators, including reports of employees tripping when entering or exiting.
- Paul Broussard, a UPS driver, made daily deliveries to the Tower and was familiar with the intermittent misalignment of the elevators.
- On January 23, 2001, Broussard was delivering a 300-pound load of computer paper on a dolly.
- He encountered an elevator with its floor elevated one and one-half to three inches above the lobby floor.
- After an initial attempt to push the dolly into the elevator failed, Broussard stepped backward into the elevator and pulled the dolly over the offset.
- The inertia from pulling the dolly caused him to lose control, forcefully pushing him into the back wall of the elevator and causing a serious back injury.
Procedural Posture:
- Paul Broussard sued the State of Louisiana in District Court for negligence.
- Following a trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Broussard, finding the elevator created an unreasonable risk of harm.
- The jury apportioned 62% of the fault to the State and 38% to Broussard.
- The District Court entered a judgment consistent with the jury's verdict.
- The State of Louisiana, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the First Circuit Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment, finding the jury was manifestly erroneous because the defect was an open and obvious hazard.
- Broussard, as petitioner, sought and was granted a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court of Louisiana to review the Court of Appeal's decision.
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Issue:
Does a one and one-half to three-inch misalignment between an elevator and lobby floor constitute an unreasonable risk of harm, even when the plaintiff was aware of the defect?
Opinions:
Majority - Knoll, Justice
Yes, the misaligned elevator created an unreasonable risk of harm, and the jury's finding was not manifestly erroneous. The determination of whether a defect presents an unreasonable risk of harm is a factual inquiry for the jury, subject to deference on appeal. The court clarifies that for a hazard to be 'open and obvious'—which would negate a breach of duty—it must be obvious to all who encounter it, not just the particular plaintiff. This approach prevents the resurrection of the assumption of the risk doctrine, which is incompatible with Louisiana's pure comparative fault system. In this case, evidence that other employees had tripped over the misaligned elevators demonstrated the defect was not obvious to all. The plaintiff's awareness of the risk is properly considered when apportioning fault, as the jury did by finding him 38% at fault, rather than as a complete bar to his recovery.
Dissenting - Victory, Justice
No, the misaligned elevator did not create an unreasonable risk of harm under these circumstances. The plaintiff's conduct was unreasonable because he was aware of the open and obvious defect yet voluntarily chose to encounter it in a risky manner by pulling a 300-pound load over it instead of waiting for another elevator. This conduct falls within traditional assumption of the risk principles and should bar recovery. The majority misapplies the 'open and obvious to all' test; the specific offset at that moment should have been obvious to anyone approaching that elevator, and whether others tripped on other misalignments is immaterial. The jury's low assessment of fault to the plaintiff was also manifestly erroneous.
Dissenting - Guidry, Justice
No, the State did not owe a duty to the plaintiff because the defective condition was open and obvious to all. The 1.5-to-3-inch offset was readily apparent to both the plaintiff and another passenger. Because the plaintiff could have easily avoided the risk by waiting for another elevator or reducing his load, the condition was not unreasonably dangerous. The court of appeal correctly found that the jury committed manifest error in holding the State liable under these circumstances.
Analysis:
This decision is significant for its clarification of the 'open and obvious' doctrine within a pure comparative fault jurisdiction. The court decisively rejects a subjective standard (what the plaintiff knew) in favor of an objective one (what is apparent to 'all comers') for determining if a hazard is open and obvious. This holding prevents a plaintiff's knowledge from serving as a total bar to recovery—a function of the old assumption of risk defense—and instead channels it into the comparative fault analysis where it is used to apportion liability. The case thereby strengthens the role of the jury in making fact-intensive 'unreasonable risk of harm' determinations and reinforces the deference owed to those findings on appeal.
