Brouillard v. Connecticut Siting Council
39 A.3d 1241, 52 Conn.Supp. 196, 2010 WL 8461043 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
Under Connecticut's Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, a party to a Siting Council proceeding is not automatically granted statutory standing to appeal the council's decision. To have standing, the party must prove classical aggrievement by demonstrating a specific, personal interest that is specially and injuriously affected by the agency's decision, with evidence beyond mere speculation.
Facts:
- The Connecticut Siting Council granted an application from Célico Partnership (d/b/a Verizon Wireless) to construct a 117-foot cell phone tower on the Simmons Farm, located at 199 Town Farm Road in Farmington.
- Claude Brouillard owns the Farmington Polo Grounds, a 59-acre property with horse stables, located directly across the street from the proposed tower site.
- Brouillard had a business partnership agreement with the Simmons family, which owned the farm, granting him 30 percent of net profits from milk sales, rights to buy hay, and rights to deposit manure on the farm.
- Brouillard claimed the tower would cause aesthetic and historic injury to the area, which he expected to remain open space.
- Brouillard also asserted that the tower's construction, fence, and electromagnetic radiation would adversely affect his business interests in the farm, milk production, and the safety of horses that cross the property.
- Additionally, Brouillard claimed an economic injury based on Célico's choice to site the tower on the Simmons Farm rather than on his own property.
Procedural Posture:
- The Connecticut Siting Council granted a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need to Célico Partnership (Verizon Wireless) to construct a cell phone tower.
- Claude Brouillard, who had been granted party status and opposed the application before the Siting Council, filed an administrative appeal of the Council's final decision in the Connecticut Superior Court.
- The defendants, Célico and the Siting Council, filed motions to dismiss Brouillard's appeal.
- The defendants argued in their motions that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Brouillard was not 'aggrieved' by the decision and therefore lacked standing to appeal.
- The Superior Court held a hearing on the issue of aggrievement to determine if it had jurisdiction over the appeal.
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Issue:
Does being a party to a Connecticut Siting Council proceeding under General Statutes § 16-50q automatically confer statutory standing to appeal, or must the party independently establish classical aggrievement by showing a specific, personal, and injuriously affected interest?
Opinions:
Majority - Vacchelli, J.
No, being a party to a Connecticut Siting Council proceeding does not automatically confer statutory standing to appeal; the party must independently establish classical aggrievement. The court reasoned that § 16-50q, which governs appeals from the Siting Council, requires that such appeals be conducted 'in accordance with the provisions of section 4-183,' the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA). Section 4-183 explicitly requires an appellant to be 'aggrieved.' The court reviewed the legislative history of a 1977 amendment, concluding that the legislature intended to make administrative appeals uniform under the UAPA's requirements, thereby eliminating any prior basis for automatic standing for parties. To establish classical aggrievement, Brouillard had to meet a two-part test: a specific, personal interest and a special, injurious effect. While his business interests in the Simmons Farm constituted a specific, personal interest, he failed to prove any special and injurious effect. His claims of harm from electromagnetic radiation, a new fence, or a gravel road were deemed speculative and unsupported by evidence, falling short of the required showing of a 'possibility' of harm.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that participation in a Connecticut administrative proceeding does not, by itself, grant a right to judicial review. It reinforces the jurisdictional requirement of standing and establishes that appellants from Siting Council decisions must meet the same 'classical aggrievement' standard as other administrative appellants under the UAPA. The case underscores the distinction between a speculative fear of harm and the demonstrable 'possibility' of harm required to establish injury for standing purposes. This precedent solidifies the court's role as a gatekeeper, ensuring that only those with a concrete, particularized injury can challenge agency actions, thereby preventing generalized grievances from flooding the judicial system.
