Brotherton v. Cleveland
59 U.S.L.W. 2457, 923 F.2d 477 (1991)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The next of kin's collective rights regarding a decedent's body, such as the right to possess it for burial and control its disposition, constitute a legitimate claim of entitlement and are therefore a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state may not extinguish this interest without providing pre-deprivation process.
Facts:
- Steven Brotherton was found pulseless and pronounced dead on arrival at Bethesda North Hospital.
- Hospital staff asked his wife, Deborah Brotherton, to consider making an anatomical gift of his organs.
- Deborah Brotherton explicitly declined to make an anatomical gift, citing her husband's personal aversion to it, and her refusal was documented in the hospital's 'Report of Death.'
- Because the death was a possible suicide, Steven Brotherton's body was transferred to the Hamilton County coroner’s office for an autopsy.
- The coroner's office had a custom and policy not to obtain consent from next of kin or inspect hospital records before removing corneas.
- Following the autopsy, the coroner permitted a technician from the Cincinnati Eye Bank to remove Steven Brotherton's corneas.
- Deborah Brotherton did not learn that her husband's corneas had been removed until she read the autopsy report.
Procedural Posture:
- Deborah Brotherton filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court, alleging a violation of her due process rights.
- The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Brotherton failed to state a claim because Ohio law does not recognize a property interest in a decedent's body.
- Deborah Brotherton, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a surviving spouse have a constitutionally protected property interest in the decedent's corneas sufficient to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when a county coroner removes the corneas without pre-deprivation notice or consent, pursuant to state statute and policy?
Opinions:
Majority - Boyce F. Martin, Jr.
Yes. A surviving spouse has a constitutionally protected property interest in a decedent's body, including the corneas. Although the existence of an interest is determined by state law, whether that interest rises to a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' protected by the Due Process Clause is a question of federal law. Ohio law grants the next of kin a 'bundle of rights,' including the right to possess the body for burial, the right to control its disposal under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, and a cause of action for its mishandling. This aggregate of rights is a substantial interest that qualifies as property under the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of how Ohio courts label it. The coroner's policy of 'intentional ignorance,' sanctioned by Ohio statute, constitutes an 'established state procedure' that caused the deprivation. Because the deprivation is permanent and the state's interest in organ donation is not substantial enough to justify disregarding these rights without a hearing, pre-deprivation process was required.
Dissenting - Joiner
No. A surviving spouse does not have a constitutionally protected property interest in a decedent's corneas. Ohio law has explicitly and consistently held that there is no property right in a dead body. The statutes governing anatomical gifts create procedural rights and duties related to organ donation; they do not create a substantive property right for the next of kin. A right to consent or object is not equivalent to a property interest. The Ohio statute is designed to promote public health by facilitating the use of corneas to restore sight, and it achieves this by allowing coroners to act in the absence of a known objection without imposing a duty to inquire. The majority is incorrect to hold that procedural rules for handling non-property can transform it into a constitutionally protected property interest.
Analysis:
This decision is significant for establishing that the substance of rights granted by a state, rather than the state's chosen label, determines whether a property interest exists for federal due process analysis. It prevents states from circumventing the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to classify certain entitlements, like a next of kin's interest in a decedent's body, as 'property.' The ruling broadened the scope of § 1983 claims by recognizing a constitutionally protected interest in the integrity of a deceased family member's body, requiring state actors like coroners to implement procedures that provide notice and an opportunity to be heard before such interests are infringed.
