Brosseau v. Haugen
543 U.S. 194 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force claim unless the law at the time of the incident clearly established, in a particularized sense, that the officer's specific conduct was unconstitutional. General principles on the use of force are insufficient to overcome qualified immunity in situations that fall within the 'hazy border' between acceptable and excessive force.
Facts:
- Glen Tamburello reported to Officer Rochelle Brosseau that his former crime partner, Kenneth Haugen, had stolen tools from him.
- Brosseau subsequently learned there was a felony no-bail warrant for Haugen's arrest for drug offenses.
- The next day, Tamburello and an associate confronted Haugen at his mother's house, leading to a physical altercation.
- Brosseau responded to a 911 call about the fight. Her arrival allowed Haugen to break free, flee on foot, and hide in the neighborhood.
- After a 30-45 minute search, Haugen ran back to his Jeep in the driveway, locked himself inside, and began searching for his keys.
- Brosseau pointed her gun at Haugen, ordered him out, and struck the window with her handgun when he refused to comply.
- Haugen started the Jeep. In the immediate vicinity were his girlfriend and her child in one car, and Tamburello and his associate in another truck.
- As the Jeep began to move, Brosseau fired a single shot through the rear driver's side window, striking Haugen in the back because she feared for the safety of other officers and civilians in the area.
Procedural Posture:
- Kenneth Haugen sued Officer Rochelle Brosseau in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, alleging an excessive force violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- The District Court granted summary judgment to Brosseau, finding she was entitled to qualified immunity.
- Haugen, as the appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court's decision, holding that Brosseau's conduct violated a clearly established Fourth Amendment right and that she was therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.
- Brosseau, as the petitioner, successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Is a police officer entitled to qualified immunity for using deadly force against a suspect attempting to flee in a vehicle, when the suspect posed a potential threat to others but no prior case law with highly similar facts had held such conduct to be unconstitutional?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. For a right to be clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what they are doing violates that right in the specific context of the case. The general prohibitions on excessive force established in Tennessee v. Garner and Graham v. Connor are cast at too high a level of generality to provide fair notice in all but the most obvious cases. Here, the existing case law on shooting fleeing suspects in vehicles did not squarely govern this specific factual scenario and, in fact, suggested that Brosseau's actions fell in the 'hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.' Because no precedent clearly established that her conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, she is entitled to qualified immunity.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
No, the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity, or at a minimum, the question should be decided by a jury. The constitutional rule from Tennessee v. Garner is well-settled: deadly force is unreasonable unless the suspect poses an immediate threat of serious physical harm. The only threat Haugen posed was the risk of a car accident while fleeing, which does not justify the use of deadly force. The majority's search for a case with identical facts is unnecessary, as general legal principles can provide fair warning. The critical question of how a reasonable officer would have assessed the threat is a fact-specific inquiry that is quintessentially a matter for the jury, not for judges to decide on summary judgment.
Concurring - Justice Breyer
This opinion concurs in the judgment but expresses concern over the rigid, two-step qualified immunity analysis mandated by Saucier v. Katz. The Saucier rule requires courts to first decide the difficult constitutional question before addressing the often easier question of whether the right was clearly established. This rigid 'order of battle' is administratively inefficient and can lead to unnecessary constitutional rulings that are effectively insulated from review. The Court should reconsider the Saucier framework.
Analysis:
This decision significantly strengthens the qualified immunity defense for law enforcement officers. It clarifies that the 'clearly established' standard requires a highly particularized inquiry, often necessitating a case with very similar facts to put an officer on notice that their conduct is unlawful. This ruling makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to overcome qualified immunity in novel factual situations, as general constitutional principles are deemed insufficient. The concurrence by Justice Breyer also foreshadowed a future shift in the Court's approach, which eventually occurred in Pearson v. Callahan, where the Court made the rigid two-step Saucier analysis permissive rather than mandatory.
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