Britton v. Wooten
817 S.W.2d 443 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
A lessee is not insulated from tort liability for negligently creating a condition that contributes to the destruction of leased property by a fire started by an arsonist. An intervening criminal act is not a superseding cause if the original actor's negligence created a foreseeable risk that a third party would commit such an act.
Facts:
- Genoa Britton leased a building to L. Wayne Wooten for the operation of Wooten’s Pic Pac Grocery.
- Employees of the grocery store stacked flammable trash and combustible materials against the exterior of the building, reaching up to the eaves.
- The accumulation of trash violated Kentucky's fire safety regulations.
- On May 8, 1983, a fire originated in the accumulated trash.
- An arson investigator from the Kentucky State Police concluded that someone intentionally set fire to the paper boxes in the trash.
- The fire spread from the trash up the exterior wall to the building's roof, resulting in the total destruction of the grocery store.
- The lease agreement contained a clause stating that if the premises were destroyed by fire, the lessee could surrender the lease 'without further obligation.'
Procedural Posture:
- Genoa Britton (lessor) filed suit against L. Wayne Wooten (lessee) in the trial court for negligence.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Wooten, the lessee.
- Britton, the lessor, appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
- Britton then sought and was granted discretionary review by the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Is a lessee insulated from liability for negligently creating a fire hazard when a lease permits cancellation 'without further obligation' after a fire, and the fire was started by an arsonist?
Opinions:
Majority - Leibson, J.
No. Neither the terms of the lease nor the criminal act of an arsonist insulates the lessee from liability for negligent conduct that was a substantial factor in the destruction of the leased premises. Regarding the lease, an exculpatory clause must clearly and unequivocally state that it releases a party from its own negligence to be effective. The clause here, allowing the lessee to surrender the lease 'without further obligation,' only relieves the lessee of future contractual duties, such as paying rent, not from tort liability for past negligence. Regarding causation, the court rejects the archaic doctrine that a criminal act automatically constitutes a superseding cause. Adopting the modern view of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court holds that an intervening criminal act does not break the chain of causation if the defendant's negligence created a situation where the defendant should have realized the likelihood that a third person might commit such a crime. The lessee's negligence in piling combustible materials against the building created the very hazard—a destructive, spreading fire—that came to pass, making the source of the spark irrelevant as a superseding cause.
Analysis:
This decision aligns Kentucky law with the modern tort principle, as articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that an intervening criminal act is not a per se superseding cause if the criminal act was a foreseeable consequence of the original negligence. It significantly curtails the old rule that a criminal act automatically breaks the chain of causation. The case also reinforces the contract law principle that exculpatory clauses attempting to waive liability for negligence are strictly construed and must be explicit to be enforced. This holding serves as a warning to property lessees that general lease-surrender provisions for fire will not protect them from liability if their own negligence contributes to the loss.
