Briscoe v. LaHue
460 U.S. 325 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
All witnesses, including police officers, are absolutely immune from civil liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on testimony given in judicial proceedings.
Facts:
- Petitioner Briscoe was tried and convicted in an Indiana state court for burglarizing a house trailer.
- At his trial, Respondent LaHue, a police officer, testified that Briscoe's thumbprint could have matched a partial print found at the crime scene.
- Briscoe alleged this was perjury, claiming that law enforcement agencies had deemed the print insufficient for identification.
- Petitioners Vickers and Ballard were tried and convicted in an Indiana state court for sexual assault.
- At their trial, Respondent Hunley, a police officer, gave testimony that allegedly diminished the credibility of their exculpatory statements by suggesting they had coordinated their stories.
- Vickers and Ballard alleged that Hunley's testimony was perjured and had deprived them of a fair trial.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioner Briscoe was convicted in Indiana state court and then sued Officer LaHue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Officer LaHue.
- Petitioners Vickers and Ballard were convicted in Indiana state court and then sued Officer Hunley under § 1983 in the U.S. District Court.
- The District Court dismissed the complaint against Officer Hunley.
- Briscoe, Vickers, and Ballard (appellants) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and affirmed the dismissals, holding that all witnesses, including police officers, are absolutely immune from civil liability for their testimony.
- The petitioners sought and were granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorize a convicted person to sue a police officer for damages for giving perjured testimony at the person's criminal trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
No, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not authorize a convicted person to assert a claim for damages against a police officer for giving perjured testimony at their criminal trial. The Court's analysis is rooted in the common law that existed when § 1983 was enacted in 1871, which granted absolute immunity to all witnesses in judicial proceedings. This immunity is necessary to protect the judicial process by encouraging witnesses to testify freely without fear of retaliatory lawsuits, which could lead to self-censorship and distort the truth-finding process. The Court's prior decisions granting absolute immunity to judges (Pierson v. Ray) and prosecutors (Imbler v. Pachtman) for their roles in the judicial process support extending the same immunity to witnesses. The Court's analysis rests on functional categories, not the status of the defendant; a police officer on the witness stand performs the same function as any other witness. Furthermore, subjecting officers to such lawsuits would impose significant burdens on the judicial system and law enforcement resources, diverting them from their primary duties.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes, a police officer should be subject to suit under § 1983 for perjurious testimony. This opinion concurs with the policy arguments in Justice Marshall's dissent, asserting that the policies underlying § 1983 and common-law immunity do not justify absolute immunity for police officer witnesses who commit perjury.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
Yes, a police officer should be subject to suit under § 1983 for perjurious testimony. The majority's extension of absolute immunity conflicts with the plain language and broad remedial purpose of § 1983, which was enacted to provide a remedy for victims of constitutional violations by state officials. Contrary to the majority's view, absolute witness immunity was not a settled common-law principle in 1871; the Supreme Court's own precedent in White v. Nicholls (1845) suggested only a qualified immunity existed. Policy considerations also weigh against absolute immunity for police officers, who testify with the authority of the state, have a professional interest in securing convictions, and are less likely to be deterred by the threat of criminal perjury prosecution than private citizens.
Dissenting - Justice Blackmun
Yes, a police officer should be subject to suit under § 1983 for perjurious testimony. This opinion agrees with Justice Marshall's dissent that the language of § 1983, common-law history, legislative history, and public policy do not support granting police officer witnesses absolute immunity.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle of absolute witness immunity within the context of § 1983 litigation, establishing that the immunity applies even to government officials like police officers. The Court's reasoning reinforces a functional approach to immunity, where an official's role in a specific proceeding, rather than their job title, determines the level of protection. This ruling creates a significant barrier for individuals seeking civil damages for wrongful convictions caused by alleged police perjury, leaving criminal prosecution for perjury as the primary, though often unused, deterrent for false testimony by law enforcement.
