Brinkley v. State
1967 Del. LEXIS 246, 233 A.2d 56 (1967)
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Rule of Law:
An intentional act, such as firing a deadly weapon in close proximity to another person, constitutes implied malice sufficient for a second-degree murder conviction if the act is so fraught with danger as to demonstrate a 'cruel and wicked indifference to human life,' even without a specific intent to kill.
Facts:
- Alexander G. Brinkley lived in a room with the victim, Evelyn Jordon.
- On April 20, 1966, while in their small bedroom, Brinkley and Jordon were arguing.
- Brinkley admitted to firing a .38 calibre revolver twice with the stated purpose of frightening Jordon, not killing her.
- Brinkley claimed the first shot went over her head and the second was fired downward while she was sitting on the bed.
- One of the bullets struck Jordon in the right eye, killing her.
- After the shooting, Brinkley went downstairs and told the homeowner to call the police because he had shot Jordon.
- Brinkley admitted to police that he had shot his girlfriend and that the revolver, found hidden in a chimney flue, was his.
- The defense introduced evidence of a hole in the bed leg, suggesting the fatal bullet ricocheted before striking Jordon.
Procedural Posture:
- Alexander G. Brinkley was prosecuted by the State in the Superior Court of Delaware (trial court).
- A jury convicted Brinkley of murder in the second degree.
- The trial court imposed a sentence based on the conviction.
- Brinkley (appellant) appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Delaware (the court rendering this opinion).
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Issue:
Does a defendant's act of intentionally firing a high-powered revolver in close proximity to another person, without a specific intent to kill, demonstrate a 'cruel and wicked indifference to human life' sufficient to support a finding of implied malice for second-degree murder?
Opinions:
Majority - Carey, Justice
Yes. Intentionally firing a deadly weapon in a small room near another person is an act so fraught with danger that it demonstrates a 'cruel and wicked indifference to human life,' which constitutes implied malice for second-degree murder. The court reasoned that when the State proves a death resulted from the intentional use of a deadly weapon, a presumption of malice arises. The burden then shifts to the defendant to provide evidence of justification, excuse, or mitigation. The jury was not required to believe the defendant's theory that the killing was an accident resulting from a ricochet. Moreover, even if Brinkley's testimony were accepted as true—that he only meant to frighten her—his actions of firing a high-powered revolver in a small room, in her general direction and just feet away, were so inherently dangerous and likely to cause death or great bodily harm that they legally constitute a 'cruel and wicked indifference to human life.' This standard, which defines implied malice, was sufficient to support the second-degree murder conviction, and the defendant's explanation did not rise to the level of a legal justification or excuse.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the concept of implied malice, specifically in the context of 'depraved heart' or 'abandoned and malignant heart' murder. It establishes that a defendant's subjective intent to kill is not required for a second-degree murder conviction. The decision emphasizes that an objective evaluation of the defendant's actions can be sufficient; if an act is so extremely reckless and dangerous, the law implies the malice necessary for murder. This precedent solidifies the principle that a 'wicked indifference to human life' is a culpable mental state equivalent to intent for the purposes of second-degree murder, impacting how prosecutors charge and courts analyze cases involving extreme recklessness resulting in death.
