Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court
53 Cal. 4th 1004, 273 P.3d 513, 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 315 (2012)
Rule of Law:
Employers must provide duty-free meal periods and authorize statutorily mandated rest periods with specific timing and frequency requirements under California law. Class certification for wage and hour claims is proper when common questions regarding an employer's uniform policy or practice predominate, even if individual issues like waiver exist, but not for "off-the-clock" claims lacking a common method of proof for employer knowledge.
Facts:
- Defendants Brinker Restaurant Corporation (Brinker) own and operate various restaurants throughout California.
- Plaintiffs Adam Hohnbaum, Iliya Haase, Romeo Osorio, Amanda June Rader, and Santana Alvarado were hourly nonexempt employees at one or more of Brinker’s restaurants.
- California law obligates employers to afford their nonexempt employees meal periods (Labor Code § 512; IWC Wage Order No. 5, subd. 11) and rest periods (Labor Code § 226.7; IWC Wage Order No. 5, subd. 12) during the workday.
- Hohnbaum alleged that Brinker failed to provide rest breaks, failed to provide meal breaks (including a theory of “early lunching” where a single meal period was provided soon after a shift began, followed by long stretches without an additional meal period), and required employees to work “off-the-clock” during meal periods.
- Brinker applied common meal and rest break policies to all its nonexempt employees.
- Brinker’s written rest break policy stated that employees working over 3.5 hours were eligible for “one ten minute rest break for each four hours” worked.
- Brinker’s formal off-the-clock policy disavowed such work, stating employees could not begin working until clocked in and working “off the clock” was a policy violation.
Procedural Posture:
- In 2002, the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) launched an investigation into Brinker's compliance with meal and rest break laws.
- The DLSE filed a lawsuit against Brinker, which eventually settled for $10 million and included a court-ordered injunction for future compliance.
- Hohnbaum filed a putative class action seeking to represent hourly nonexempt employees of Brinker's restaurants, alleging violations of meal and rest break laws and off-the-clock work.
- The trial court, in aid of mediation, issued an advisory opinion (later confirmed as a court order) holding that an employer’s meal period obligations are not satisfied simply by affording one meal period for shifts over five hours, but rather a meal period is required for each five-hour work period.
- Brinker filed a writ petition in the Court of Appeal challenging this advisory opinion, which was denied.
- Hohnbaum then moved for class certification, proposing a class with Rest Period, Meal Period, and Off-The-Clock subclasses.
- The trial court granted class certification for all three subclasses, finding common issues predominated over individual issues.
- The Court of Appeal granted writ relief and reversed class certification as to the three disputed subclasses, holding that the trial court was required to resolve threshold legal disputes over the scope of Brinker's duties before certification and that, upon resolving them, certification was inappropriate.
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Issue:
1. Does a trial court abuse its discretion by certifying a class without first resolving threshold legal disputes regarding the elements of the plaintiffs' claims, even if such resolution is not necessarily dispositive of the certification question?
2. What is the nature of an employer's duty to provide meal periods under California Labor Code section 512 and IWC Wage Order No. 5, specifically regarding ensuring no work is done and the timing requirements?
3. What is the scope of an employer's duty to provide rest periods under California Wage Order No. 5, specifically regarding the rate of authorization and timing?
4. Are claims alleging a uniform company policy that violates wage and hour laws suitable for class certification, and does the potential for individual waiver arguments preclude such certification?
5. Is an "off-the-clock" subclass suitable for class certification without evidence of a uniform policy or common means of proof regarding employer knowledge?
Opinions:
Majority - Werdegar, J.
No, a trial court is not obligated to resolve all threshold legal disputes over the elements of a plaintiff's claims before deciding class certification, unless a particular determination is necessarily dispositive of the certification question. An employer's obligation for meal periods is to relieve its employee of all duty, with the employee thereafter at liberty to use the meal period as desired, but the employer need not ensure no work is done. A first meal period must be provided no later than the end of an employee’s fifth hour of work, and a second meal period no later than the end of an employee’s tenth hour of work; Wage Order No. 5 does not impose additional timing requirements. For rest periods, an employer must authorize and permit 10 minutes net rest time per four hours or major fraction thereof (e.g., 10 minutes for shifts 3.5-6 hours, 20 minutes for >6-10 hours), and these periods should, where practicable, be in the middle of each work period. Claims alleging a uniform policy that violates wage and hour laws are suitable for class treatment, and the possibility of waiver as an affirmative defense does not preclude certification. However, certification of the "off-the-clock" subclass was improper due to a lack of evidence of common policies or means of proof regarding employer knowledge.
The court clarified that class certification is primarily a procedural question, and courts should generally postpone resolving merits disputes unless they are inextricably linked to the certification requirements. While issues affecting the merits may overlap with class action requirements, such inquiries must be limited to those aspects of the merits that affect decisions essential to class certification. Here, the Court of Appeal erred by imposing a per se requirement that the trial court resolve all legal disputes over the scope of Brinker’s duties before certifying the class.
Regarding meal periods, the court held that under Wage Order No. 5 and Labor Code section 512, subdivision (a), an employer's duty is to provide an uninterrupted 30-minute period during which the employee is relieved of all duty and free to use the time as desired. This means the employer must relinquish control over the employee’s activities and not impede or discourage them from taking the break. However, the employer is not obligated to police meal breaks to ensure no work is performed. For timing, Labor Code section 512, subdivision (a) requires a first meal period no later than the start of an employee's sixth hour of work and a second meal period no later than the start of the 11th hour for shifts over 10 hours. The court found that Wage Order No. 5 does not impose additional, more restrictive timing requirements.
For rest periods, Wage Order No. 5, subdivision 12(A) mandates 10 minutes of net rest time per four hours of work or "major fraction thereof," which means more than half. Thus, employees are entitled to 10 minutes for shifts from 3.5 to 6 hours, 20 minutes for shifts over 6 hours up to 10 hours, and so on. Rest periods must be placed “in the middle of each work period insofar as practicable,” but there is no legal requirement that rest periods must precede meal periods.
The court reversed the decertification of the rest period subclass. It found that Hohnbaum presented substantial evidence of a uniform corporate rest break policy that, as interpreted by the court, potentially violated Wage Order No. 5 (e.g., by authorizing only one 10-minute break for a seven-hour shift when two are required). Such claims based on a uniform policy are amenable to class treatment, and the employer's contention of employee waiver is an affirmative defense, not a bar to certification for unauthorized breaks.
The meal period subclass certification was remanded for reconsideration because the trial court's initial certification was potentially influenced by an erroneous legal assumption about meal timing (that a meal period was required every five hours after a previous meal or shift start). The class definition as initially drawn was overinclusive in light of the Supreme Court's clarification of meal timing.
The court affirmed the decertification of the "off-the-clock" subclass. Unlike the rest break claim, there was no evidence of a common policy or common method of proof that Brinker systematically pressured or required employees to work off-the-clock. Proving liability would require individualized inquiry into whether Brinker knew or should have known of such work, which is not suitable for class treatment given the record.
Concurring - Werdegar, J.
The remand for meal period subclass certification does not endorse Brinker’s argument that the question of why a meal period was missed renders meal period claims categorically uncertifiable. An employer has an obligation to relieve employees for meal periods and to record having done so. If an employer’s records show no meal period for a shift over five hours, a rebuttable presumption arises that the employee was not relieved of duty and no meal period was provided. An employer’s assertion that an employee waived a meal period is an affirmative defense, with the burden on the employer to plead and prove it.
Individual issues arising from an affirmative defense do not pose a per se bar to class certification; instead, the question is the manageability of such individual issues. Individual damages questions rarely prevent class certification. The court has long encouraged using various methods like representative testimony, surveys, and statistical analysis to manage determinations of liability and damages in class actions, which are available tools to render such determinations manageable for meal period claims on remand.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarified the scope of employers' duties regarding meal and rest periods under California wage and hour laws, providing crucial guidance for employers and employees alike. It refined class action jurisprudence by emphasizing that courts should generally avoid merits inquiries at the certification stage unless directly necessary, but also clarified that uniform corporate policies violating wage laws are strong candidates for class treatment. The ruling provided a framework for managing individual defenses, such as waiver, within a class action context through aggregate proof, thus preventing defendants from using individualized inquiries to avoid class-wide liability for systemic issues. However, it also set a higher bar for "off-the-clock" class actions by requiring evidence of a common policy or proof method for employer knowledge, distinguishing these claims from those arising from formal policy violations.
