Briggs v. Carol Cars, Inc.
553 N.E.2d 930, 1990 Mass. LEXIS 204, 407 Mass. 391 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
A seller's representation that a product is in 'good condition,' when made by a knowledgeable dealer to an uninformed consumer, can be considered a misrepresentation of fact rather than mere opinion, and if made recklessly, can support a claim for fraud or deceit.
Facts:
- On July 19, 1982, the plaintiff purchased a 1976 Plymouth Arrow automobile from the defendant, a car dealership.
- The defendant represented to the plaintiff that the automobile was in 'good condition,' had only one previous owner, and had low mileage.
- The plaintiff, who had no knowledge of automobile mechanics, test-drove the car but did not have it inspected by an independent mechanic before the purchase.
- Two days after the sale, the plaintiff noticed smoke coming from the exhaust and discovered the car was consuming excessive amounts of oil, requiring nine quarts in nine days.
- The vehicle began stalling periodically, and on July 30, after the plaintiff had driven it 583 miles, she had it towed to a repair shop.
- A mechanic found significant rust and rot on the 'rear bumper support' and 'strut towers' and concluded the car needed considerable engine and body work to operate safely.
- The plaintiff sought a full refund, but the defendant refused, offering only to repair the engine under the limited warranty.
- The plaintiff subsequently had the car towed back to the defendant's lot and purchased a different car from another seller for substitute transportation.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant in the Superior Court (trial court).
- The amended complaint alleged violations of G. L. c. 231, § 85J (deceit) and c. 93A, § 9 (unfair or deceptive practices).
- Following a jury-waived trial, the judge found for the plaintiff.
- The trial court awarded the plaintiff treble damages under the deceit statute and attorney's fees under the consumer protection statute.
- The defendant (appellant) appealed the judgment from the Superior Court.
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (the state's highest court) transferred the case from the intermediate appellate court on its own motion.
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Issue:
Does a used car dealer's representation to an uninformed buyer that a vehicle is in 'good condition' constitute an actionable misrepresentation of fact that, if false and made recklessly, can support a claim for fraud or deceit under G. L. c. 231, § 85J?
Opinions:
Majority - O’Connor, J.
Yes. A used car dealer's representation that a vehicle is in 'good condition' can constitute an actionable misrepresentation of fact. The court reasoned that while mere statements of opinion are not typically actionable, a statement of opinion can imply that the speaker knows facts that justify that opinion. In this case, given the dealer's expertise and the buyer's lack of knowledge, the representation that the car was in 'good condition' reasonably implied it was safe, operable, and did not have severe mechanical defects. Because the defects were readily ascertainable by the dealer, making such a statement without verifying its truth constituted a reckless misrepresentation sufficient for an action in deceit. The court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 539, noting that a statement of fact made as of one's own knowledge, if false, can be the basis for deceit.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the boundary between non-actionable 'puffery' or opinion and actionable misrepresentation of fact in consumer transactions. It establishes that a seller's expertise and a buyer's relative lack of knowledge are critical factors in determining how a statement should be interpreted. By holding that a dealer's assertion about a product's condition implies a factual basis, the ruling strengthens consumer protection and holds expert sellers to a higher standard of truthfulness. This precedent makes it more difficult for sellers to evade liability for false or reckless claims by framing them as mere opinions, particularly when the truth is easily discoverable.
