Brewster v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center
296 Ill. Dec. 884, 836 N.E.2d 635, 361 Ill. App. 3d 32 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
An employer, such as a hospital, does not owe a duty of care to a third party injured by an off-duty employee, even if the employee's impairment was a foreseeable result of their work conditions. In Illinois, such a duty to control the conduct of another arises only when a 'special relationship,' as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 315-319, exists between the defendant and the person causing the injury or the injured third party.
Facts:
- Sook Im Hong was a first-year resident doctor at Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center (the hospital).
- On July 13 and 14, 1997, Hong was scheduled for a 36-hour work shift.
- Hong worked for 34 of the scheduled 36 hours.
- Immediately after leaving the hospital following her shift, Hong fell asleep while driving her car.
- Hong's car struck a vehicle driven by Heather Brewster, causing Heather to suffer injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Brewster, on behalf of Heather Brewster, filed a negligence action in the trial court against Sook Im Hong and Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center.
- The hospital filed a motion to dismiss the claims against it for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
- The trial court granted the hospital's motion to dismiss.
- Brewster, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's dismissal of the claims against the hospital, the appellee, to the intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a hospital owe a duty of care to a third party who is injured in a car accident caused by a sleep-deprived, off-duty resident physician, when the resident's exhaustion is the alleged result of the hospital's work hour policies?
Opinions:
Majority - Presiding Justice Cahill
No. A hospital does not owe a duty of care to a third party injured by an off-duty resident under these circumstances. The court's reasoning is grounded in the established Illinois principle that there is no general duty to control the conduct of another person to prevent harm to a third party. Such a duty arises only in cases where a 'special relationship' exists, as adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court from the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 315-319. The court found no such special relationship between the hospital and Heather Brewster, a member of the general public. Citing Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital, the court affirmed that healthcare providers are generally not liable for injuries to nonpatient third parties. As an intermediate appellate court, it declined to create a new public policy exception to this rule, stating that modifying supreme court precedent is beyond its authority.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the stringent 'special relationship' requirement for establishing a duty to control the conduct of another in Illinois tort law. It signifies that foreseeability of harm alone is insufficient to create a duty, particularly in cases of third-party liability against employers for the off-duty conduct of their employees. The court's deference to supreme court precedent illustrates the judiciary's reluctance to expand tort liability through public policy arguments, placing the responsibility for such changes on the state's highest court or legislature. This case effectively shields employers from liability for injuries caused by fatigued employees after they have left the employer's premises and are no longer acting within the scope of their employment.
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