Brewster McCauley v. City of Chicag
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 21179, 671 F.3d 611, 2011 WL 4975644 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
To state a plausible claim for municipal liability under the Equal Protection Clause based on a failure to protect, a complaint must plead specific factual content suggesting an intentional policy or custom of discrimination, not merely conclusory allegations or facts that are also consistent with a lawful, albeit imperfect, allocation of limited public resources.
Facts:
- In 1993, Glenford Martinez was convicted of murder and was later released on parole in 2006.
- In November 2007, Martinez was arrested for domestic battery against his ex-girlfriend, Mersaides McCauley.
- Following the arrest, an Illinois court issued a plenary order of protection against Martinez, prohibiting him from having any contact with McCauley.
- The Cook County State's Attorney's Office notified Martinez's parole officer at the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) of the battery charge, which constituted a parole violation.
- Despite being notified, IDOC officials never issued a parole-violation warrant for Martinez's arrest.
- Martinez continued to contact and harass McCauley, repeatedly violating the order of protection.
- Chicago police were allegedly aware of these ongoing violations but never arrested Martinez.
- On April 6, 2008, Martinez blocked McCauley's car in a church parking lot, shot and killed her, and subsequently committed suicide.
Procedural Posture:
- Brewster McCauley, as administrator of his daughter's estate, filed a lawsuit in Illinois state court against the City of Chicago and other officials.
- The defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
- The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
- The district court granted the defendants' motion, dismissing the federal claims, including the equal-protection claim against the City.
- The district court also denied McCauley's request for limited discovery to find a basis for a personal-capacity claim against the IDOC director.
- McCauley, as appellant, appealed the dismissal and the denial of discovery to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a complaint state a plausible claim for relief under the Equal Protection Clause against a city when it alleges a policy of providing less protection to domestic violence victims but fails to plead specific facts suggesting intentional discrimination, instead offering conclusory allegations and facts also consistent with a lawful allocation of limited police resources?
Opinions:
Majority - Sykes, Circuit Judge.
No. A complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief under the Equal Protection Clause against a city where its factual allegations suggest a failure to provide special protection to a class of victims, rather than an intentional denial of equal protection. To survive a motion to dismiss under the Twombly/Iqbal standard, a plaintiff must plead factual content that plausibly suggests the municipality maintained a policy of intentional discrimination. Here, the complaint's allegations that the City failed to have specific policies to protect domestic violence victims are conclusory or, at best, describe a failure to provide special protection, not a selective withdrawal of police protection. The alleged failures are just as consistent with a lawful, if inefficient, allocation of limited police resources as they are with intentional discrimination, which presents an 'obvious alternative explanation' that prevents the claim from crossing the line from conceivable to plausible.
Dissenting - Hamilton, Circuit Judge,
Yes. The complaint should be sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, even under the new pleading standards of Ashcroft v. Iqbal. The dissent criticizes the Iqbal standard as subjective, inconsistent with federal rules and prior precedent, and dangerous in that it risks premature dismissal of meritorious claims. While skeptical of the plaintiff's ability to ultimately prove the claim, the dissent argues that the complaint provided sufficient notice to the City by alleging specific failures to act despite knowledge of Martinez's violations, which is factually consistent with a policy of deliberate indifference. The dissent contends the majority extended Iqbal too aggressively and that, at a minimum, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to amend the complaint to meet the new, uncertain standards.
Analysis:
This case exemplifies the significant impact of the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility pleading standard on civil rights litigation, particularly on Monell claims against municipalities. The decision clarifies that alleging a failure to provide adequate or special police protection to a specific group is insufficient to state an equal protection claim. Instead, plaintiffs must plead concrete facts that make it plausible, not just conceivable, that the municipality had an intentional policy of providing lesser protection to that group compared to others. This raises the bar for plaintiffs, often requiring them to have specific evidence of discriminatory intent at the outset of litigation, which can be difficult to obtain without discovery.
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