Brewer v. State
140 Tex. Crim. 9, 143 S.W.2d 599, 1940 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 486 (1940)
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Rule of Law:
A vehicle owner who knowingly entrusts their car to an intoxicated driver, remains in the vehicle as a passenger, and permits the driver to operate it recklessly, can be held criminally liable as a principal for murder with malice if the driver's actions result in a death.
Facts:
- The appellant, the owner of a Ford V-8, and his companion, Leo Spears, engaged in a day-long drinking spree.
- The appellant placed his car in Spears' control, who drove at all times with the appellant seated beside him.
- Throughout the day, they were so intoxicated that several proprietors refused to sell them more alcohol and admonished them to stay off the highways.
- They ignored these warnings, boasting they could drive drunk without consequence, and proceeded to drive recklessly, at one point crashing into a cattle-guard.
- While traveling at a high rate of speed, the car driven by Spears struck the rear of another vehicle carrying a family.
- The force of the collision threw the occupants of the other car from their vehicle, including a five-month-old baby who was in its mother's lap.
- The baby was thrown onto the pavement, suffered a crushed skull, and died two days later.
Procedural Posture:
- The appellant was indicted on two counts of murder in the District Court of DeWitt County.
- The appellant's case was severed from that of his co-defendant, Leo Spears.
- The trial court overruled the appellant's motion for a continuance.
- The case was submitted to a jury, which returned a general verdict convicting the appellant of murder.
- The trial court sentenced the appellant to five years in the penitentiary.
- The appellant appealed his conviction to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
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Issue:
Is a vehicle owner who knowingly permits an intoxicated person to drive his car, while riding as a passenger, guilty of murder with malice as a principal when the driver's reckless operation of the vehicle results in a fatal collision?
Opinions:
Majority - Beauchamp, J.
Yes. A vehicle owner who knowingly permits an intoxicated person to drive his car and remains present while it is operated recklessly is guilty of murder as a principal if a death results. Under Article 69 of the Penal Code, a person who advises or agrees to the commission of an offense and is present is a principal. By placing his car in the hands of an intoxicated Spears and remaining with him during hours of reckless driving, the appellant advised and agreed to the criminal conduct. Citing Story v. United States, the court reasoned that an owner who knowingly puts a 'dangerous instrumentality' like a car in the control of a reckless driver and permits him to operate it so negligently as to cause death is as responsible as the driver. Furthermore, the court found sufficient evidence of malice, not as a specific intent to kill, but as an implied malice arising from conduct so reckless and wanton that it demonstrated 'a depravity of mind and disregard for human life.' The appellant's and his companion's continuous dangerous conduct throughout the day provided the basis for this finding.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the principle of principal liability for an owner-passenger in vehicular homicide cases. It establishes that a car can be treated as a 'dangerous instrumentality' when knowingly entrusted to an intoxicated driver, creating a high level of responsibility for the owner. The decision broadens the concept of implied malice, affirming that a sustained course of reckless conduct, not just the final fatal act, can be sufficient to prove the 'depraved heart' mental state required for a murder conviction. This precedent makes it significantly easier for prosecutors to charge non-driving vehicle owners who are complicit in reckless, intoxicated driving that results in a fatality.
