Brendan Dassey v. Michael Dittmann
877 F.3d 297 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a federal court cannot grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner unless the state court's adjudication of the claim was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. A state court's finding that a juvenile's confession was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances is not an unreasonable application of law if fairminded jurists could disagree about the conclusion, even if significant factors weigh against voluntariness.
Facts:
- On October 31, 2005, photographer Teresa Halbach was murdered after an appointment at a salvage yard owned by the Avery family.
- Investigators later found Halbach's charred human remains in a burn pit on the property.
- Brendan Dassey, the 16-year-old nephew of Steven Avery, lived nearby and had an IQ in the low-average to borderline range.
- In February 2006, Dassey was interviewed by police and admitted to helping his uncle clean a spill and seeing parts of a human body in a bonfire.
- On March 1, 2006, investigators Mark Wiegert and Tom Fassbender took Dassey from his high school to a sheriff's department for another interview, with his mother's permission but without her presence.
- During the three-hour videotaped interrogation, after waiving his Miranda rights, Dassey confessed to helping Steven Avery rape, kill, and mutilate Teresa Halbach.
- The investigators used calm tones and offered breaks, but also employed deceptive tactics, made repeated assurances that honesty would help him, and prodded Dassey when his answers were inconsistent or did not align with their theories.
- Dassey's account of the crimes changed multiple times, he appeared to guess at critical details when pressed, and after confessing, he asked if he would be back at school in time for a project.
Procedural Posture:
- In the Wisconsin state trial court, Brendan Dassey moved to suppress his confession as involuntary.
- The trial court denied the motion, and a jury subsequently convicted Dassey of homicide, sexual assault, and mutilation of a corpse.
- Dassey appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction, holding that the confession was voluntary.
- The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Dassey's petition for review.
- Dassey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
- The district court granted the writ, finding Dassey's confession was involuntary and its admission violated his due process rights.
- The State of Wisconsin appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, where a three-judge panel affirmed the district court's decision.
- The Seventh Circuit then granted the State's petition to rehear the case en banc.
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Issue:
Did the Wisconsin state court's decision that Brendan Dassey's confession was voluntary represent an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts, as required for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)?
Opinions:
Majority - Hamilton
No. The Wisconsin state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Under AEDPA's highly deferential standard, the federal court's role is not to determine if the state court was correct, but whether its decision was so lacking in justification that it was beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. The totality of the circumstances test for voluntariness is a general standard, affording state courts significant leeway. While factors like Dassey's age, intellectual limitations, and the investigators' assurances of leniency weigh against voluntariness, many other factors support the state court's finding: he received and understood Miranda warnings, his mother consented to the interview, the setting was not physically coercive, the duration was relatively brief, and he provided many incriminating details himself while resisting other suggestions. The state court’s factual finding that no 'frank promises of leniency' were made was not unreasonable, as the investigators' statements could reasonably be viewed as encouraging honesty rather than making specific promises. Because reasonable jurists could debate the outcome, federal habeas relief is inappropriate.
Dissenting - Wood
Yes. The Wisconsin court's decision was an unreasonable application of federal law and based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The state court failed to apply the 'special care' mandated by the Supreme Court when evaluating a juvenile's confession, particularly one from a mentally limited 16-year-old. Dassey's confession was the product of psychological coercion; the investigators fed him facts through a relentless, manipulative interrogation that amounted to a 'ghoulish game of 20 Questions.' His will was overborne by psychologically manipulative tactics and false promises that honesty would set him free, which a person of his limited intellect would take literally. The resulting confession is riddled with contradictions and input from the police, rendering it wholly unreliable. The state court's conclusion that the confession was voluntary was an unreasonable determination of fact in light of the clear evidence of coercion on the video record.
Dissenting - Rovner
Yes. The state court's decision was unreasonable because it failed to properly account for modern scientific understanding of coercion within the totality of the circumstances analysis. Long-held assumptions that innocent people do not confess have been proven false by extensive social science research, which shows that juveniles and the intellectually disabled are uniquely susceptible to the psychologically coercive police tactics used here. Techniques like maximization (exaggerating evidence) and minimization (downplaying the crime), which are features of the Reid Technique used on Dassey, are known to produce false confessions. A proper 'special care' review, as required by Supreme Court precedent, must consider the known coercive impact of these interrogation methods on a vulnerable youth like Dassey. The state court failed to conduct such a review, resulting in a profound miscarriage of justice.
Analysis:
This decision exemplifies the formidable barrier that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) creates for state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief. The court's ruling reinforces that even in a highly publicized and factually troubling case, federal courts must defer to state court decisions unless they are objectively unreasonable, not merely incorrect. The case highlights the significant leeway state courts possess when applying general, fact-intensive standards like the 'totality of the circumstances' test for confession voluntariness. The powerful dissents underscore the growing tension between established legal precedent on interrogation tactics and emerging social science research on the causes of false confessions, particularly among vulnerable populations.
