Breard v. Greene
1998 U.S. LEXIS 2465, 523 U.S. 371, 140 L. Ed. 2d 529 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
A claim based on a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is subject to the same procedural default rules that apply to other federal law claims. Furthermore, when a treaty conflicts with a subsequently enacted federal statute, the statute controls under the last-in-time rule.
Facts:
- Angel Francisco Breard, a citizen of Paraguay, came to the United States in 1986.
- In 1992, Breard was charged with the attempted rape and capital murder of Ruth Dickie in Virginia.
- Following his arrest, the arresting authorities failed to inform Breard of his right as a foreign national to contact the Paraguayan Consulate.
- At his trial, Breard confessed to the murder but claimed he acted under a Satanic curse from his father-in-law.
- Against the advice of his attorneys, Breard rejected a plea offer from the state that would have allowed him to avoid the death penalty.
Procedural Posture:
- Angel Francisco Breard was convicted of attempted rape and capital murder in a Virginia state trial court and sentenced to death in 1993.
- The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Breard's convictions and sentences on direct appeal.
- Breard's petitions for state collateral relief were denied.
- Breard filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court, raising his Vienna Convention claim for the first time.
- The District Court denied the petition, holding the claim was procedurally defaulted.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of habeas relief.
- Separately, the Republic of Paraguay sued Virginia officials in U.S. District Court; the suit was dismissed on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
- Paraguay initiated proceedings against the United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which issued a provisional order requesting a stay of execution.
- Breard and Paraguay filed petitions for certiorari, an original petition for habeas corpus, a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint, and applications for a stay of execution with the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations trump the domestic law doctrine of procedural default, thereby allowing a foreign national to raise a claim for violation of the Convention for the first time in a federal habeas corpus proceeding?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. The Vienna Convention does not override the established U.S. legal doctrine of procedural default. Claims under the Vienna Convention, like constitutional claims, are procedurally defaulted if not first raised in state court. The Court reasoned that the Convention itself requires that the rights it provides be exercised in conformity with the laws of the receiving state, and procedural default is such a law. Furthermore, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal statute passed after the Convention was ratified, restricts the ability of habeas petitioners to develop the factual basis of claims not raised in state court. Under the 'last-in-time' rule, this subsequent statute supersedes the treaty's provisions to the extent they conflict. Finally, Breard failed to show he was prejudiced by the violation, as it is speculative that consular assistance would have altered his decision to reject a plea bargain, especially since he had already ignored his own lawyers' advice.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
The dissent does not answer the substantive legal question but argues the Court should grant the application for a stay. Justice Stevens contended that the Commonwealth of Virginia's decision to set an imminent execution date deprived the Court of the necessary time for 'considered deliberation' on the complex international and domestic legal issues. He argued that the Court should adhere to its established rules and procedures for orderly disposition, especially in a case with significant international aspects, rather than acting hastily.
Dissenting - Justice Ginsburg
The dissent does not answer the substantive legal question but argues for a stay of execution. Justice Ginsburg stated she would grant the stay 'in order to consider in the ordinary course the instant petition, Breard’s first federal petition for writ of habeas corpus.'
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
The dissent does not definitively answer the substantive legal question but argues the issues are sufficiently difficult to warrant a stay and further consideration. Justice Breyer argued that Breard's claims regarding cause for his procedural default (the novelty of the Vienna Convention claim) and prejudice were not 'obviously without merit.' He also suggested more time was needed to consider the international aspects of the case. He concluded that Virginia's expedited execution schedule was unwarranted and that the Court should grant the stay to consider the petitions in the ordinary course.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle that U.S. domestic procedural rules govern the implementation of international treaties in U.S. courts. It confirms that rights under the Vienna Convention are not 'super-rights' that bypass ordinary litigation requirements like procedural default. The case also serves as a strong reaffirmation of the 'last-in-time' rule, empowering Congress to legislatively override prior treaty obligations. This ruling significantly limits the ability of foreign nationals to use consular notification violations as a basis to overturn criminal convictions, especially if the claim was not timely raised in state proceedings, and signals to the international community that domestic law holds primacy in U.S. courts.
